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Abstract
In recent years, the phenomenal technological developments in information tech-
nology have led to an increase in the capability to store and record personal data
about customers and individuals. This has led to concerns that the personal data
may be misused for a variety of purposes. In order to alleviate these concerns,
a number of techniques have been recently proposed in order to perform data
mining tasks that are privacy-preserving. Thus the eld of privacy has seen rapid
advances in recent years and in the data mining environment have led to increased
concerns about privacy. In this thesis, we develop ecient, eective and realis-
tic methods in the privacy-preserving data mining eld focusing on three core
techniques, namely access control, data anonymization and statistical disclosure
control.
In Part I, this thesis presents a model for privacy preserving access control
which is based on a variety of purposes. Conditional purpose is applied along
with allowed purpose and prohibited purpose in the model. It allows users to
use some data for certain purposes with conditions. The structure of the condi-
tional purpose-based access control model (CPBAC) is dened and investigated
through a practical paradigm with access purpose and intended purpose. An
algorithm is developed to achieve the compliance computation between access
purposes and intended purposes. According to this model, more information
from data providers can be extracted while at the same time assuring privacy
that maximizes the usability of consumers' data. This model extends traditional
access control models to a further coverage of privacy preservation in the data
iii
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mining environment. Its interior is a new structure for managing collected data
in an eective and trustworthy way. This structure helps enterprises to circulate
clear privacy promises and to collect and manage user preferences and consent.
Finally, we inject this model with the conventional well known role-based access
control (RBAC) model as RBAC is still the most popular approach towards access
control to achieve database security and is available in many DBMS. The notion
of applying these mechanisms to allow web sites to publish a privacy policy, and
implement more nuanced management of usage information and other personal
information, ultimately allows (legitimate) use of information.
In Part II, this thesis presents a systematic clustering based k-anonymization
technique to minimize the information loss and at the same time assure data
quality. The proposed technique adopts a system to group similar data together
and then anonymize each group individually. The structure of systematic clus-
tering problem is dened and investigated through paradigm and properties. An
algorithm of the proposed problem is developed and it is shown that the time
complexity is in O(n
2
k
), where n is the total number of records containing individ-
uals and their private information. Experimental results show that the proposed
method attains a reasonable dominance with respect to both information loss
and execution time. A way out is also shown to illustrate the usability of the
algorithm for incremental datasets. Finally we extend the systematic-clustering
approach to the l-diversity model that assumes that every group of indistinguish-
able records contains at least l distinct sensitive attribute values. The whole
procedure consists of the two steps, namely a clustering step for k-anonymization
and an l-diverse step.
In Part III, this thesis presents two heuristic algorithms for microdata protec-
tion in Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC). The rst heuristic microaggregation
algorithm works by partitioning the microdata into clusters of at least k records
in a systematic way and then replacing the records in each cluster with the cen-
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troid of the cluster which we refer to systematic microaggregation for SDC. The
structure of the systematic microaggregation problem is dened and investigated
and an algorithm of the proposed problem is developed. Experimental results
show that the systematic microaggregation attains a reasonable dominance with
respect to both information loss and execution time than the most popular heuris-
tic algorithm called Maximum Distance to Average Vector (MDAV). Finally it
has shown that the systematic microaggregation is highly scalable.
The second heuristic algorithm, called pairwise-systematic (P-S) microaggre-
gation easily captures extreme values in the dataset and works by adopting si-
multaneously two distant groups at a time with the corresponding similar records
together in a systematic way. Extensive experimental studies are conducted to
show the eciency and the eectiveness of the algorithm. The performance of the
P-S algorithm is compared against the most recent microaggregation methods.
Experimental results show that the P-S algorithm incurs signicantly less infor-
mation loss compared to the latest microaggregation methods for all of the test
situations. Finally we propose a new microaggregation method where centroid
is considered as median. The new method guarantees that the microaggregated
data and the original data are similar by using a statistical test.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The phenomenal technological developments in information technology have lit-
erally transformed our lives in recent years. The explosive growth of the Internet
and e-commerce have enabled people to carry out daily activities online, for exam-
ple, on line shopping, e-banking, and even consulting a doctor over the Internet.
Such ubiquitous online activities imply that a vast amount of personal data is
electronically produced and collected continuously. Over the last few decades,
there has been a tremendous growth in the amount of private data collected
about individuals. With the rapid growth in databases, networking, and comput-
ing technologies, such data can be integrated and analyzed digitally. On the one
hand, this has led to the development of data mining tools that aim to infer useful
trends from this data. This collected data can also be used for various purposes,
ranging from scientic research to demographic trend analysis or marketing pur-
poses. For instance, medical researchers may nd out the factors associated with
autism from a collection of autistic babies records, or government agencies can
know the socioeconomic and demographic characteristics of its people and may
make critical decisions based on various data collected by them. On the other
hand, easy access to personal data poses a threat to individual privacy. Hav-
ing observed many privacy related incidents [106, 107, 108, 109], individuals are
afraid that their personal information might fall into the wrong hands and be
abused against their will. As individuals are more concerned about their privacy,
1
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they are becoming more reluctant to carry out their businesses and transactions
online, and many organizations are losing a considerable amount of potential
prots [66]. Research shows that on-line commerce was reduced by US$15 billion
in 2001 due to individual privacy concerns. Thus the eld of privacy1 has seen
rapid advances in recent years and in the data mining environment this has lead
to increased concerns about privacy.
Data Privacy problems exist wherever uniquely identiable data relating to
a person or persons are collected and stored, in digital form or otherwise. The
challenge in data privacy is to share data while protecting the personally identi-
able information. Thus, personal data should be protected in such a way that
only authorized users can access the data. The way of protecting personal data
in such a way is called access control. Personal data can also be protected by
anonymizing identiable information before disclosing. This procedure of data
protection is called anonymization. On the other hand, data can be modied in
such a way that statistical results from the original data and the modied data
are the same or at least similar. The process of producing modied data that pro-
duce similar statistical results of the original data is called Statistical disclosure
Control (SDC).
In this thesis, we provide models and algorithms for protecting the privacy
of individuals in data sets while still allowing users to mine useful trends and
statistics. The thesis addresses problems from three areas, namely access control,
data anonymization and statistical disclosure control (SDC). Specically, access
control enables DBMS to tightly control data access with respect to privacy re-
quirements and preferences, data anonymization provides a way to guarantee
privacy protection in data itself even if the control of access is not feasible, and
the SDC is to control the risk that information about specic individuals can be
extracted from amongst statistical summary results. We present formal models
1Privacy is dened as the right of an individual to decide when, how, and to what extent
he/she would like to share his/her information
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and develop mechanisms for realizing such models.
1.1 Overview and Motivation
1.1.1 Access Control
Access control is one of the fundamental security mechanisms for information
systems. It determines the availability of resources to principles, operations that
can be performed, and under what circumstances [110]. Figure 1.1 shows the
major functional components of a typical access control system. The Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) interacts directly with users. When a user tries to
access a resource, the PEP forms an appropriate access request that includes the
attributes of the requester, the requested action, and the requested resource, and
passes the request to the Policy Decision Points (PDP). The PDP looks up the
access control policy that applies to the request, and returns a response to the
PEP. The PEP then correspondingly permits or denies the user's action.
User
Access
Request
Access
Decision
Policy
Enforcement
Point
Policy
Decision
Point
Request Response
Resource
Access
Granted
Access Control Policies
Figure 1.1: Major components of an access control system
As Privacy is one of the major issues to be handled in many environments,
many privacy protecting access control models have been proposed [48, 67, 73,
104]. Privacy protection cannot be easily achieved by traditional access control
models because of two reasons. The rst reason is that while traditional access
control models focus on which user is performing which action on which data
object, privacy policies are concerned with which data object is used for which
purpose(s). Fox example, a typical privacy policy such as \we will collect and use
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customer identiable information for billing purposes to enable us to anticipate
and resolve problems with your service" does not specify who can access the
customer information, but only states that the information can be accessed for
the purpose of billing, customer service, and possibly some analysis. The second
reason is that the comfort level of data usage varies from individual to individual.
For example, some online consumers may feel that it is acceptable to disclose
their purchase history or browsing habits in return for better service, such as
site personalization [103] but other customers may believe that such techniques
breach their privacy. Some organizations may have published privacy policies,
which promise privacy protection practices on data collection, use and disclosure,
but these practices may not be implemented. To maintain consistency between
privacy policy and practices, privacy protection requirements in privacy policy
should be formally specied.
The notion of purpose might play a major role in access control models in order
to protect privacy. Thus an appropriate metadata model must be developed to
support such privacy centric access control models. Byun et al. [54] proposed
a purpose-based access control (PBAC), where purpose is used as the basis of
access control. The PBAC model is based on intended purposes, which specify the
intended usage of data and access purposes which specify the purposes for which
a given data element is accessed. Extending this idea, in this thesis we propose
an enhanced PBAC, called conditional purpose-based access control (CPBAC).
The CPBAC model is based on a variety of purposes and conditional purpose is
applied along with allowed purpose and prohibited purpose in the model. This
allows users to use some data for certain purpose with conditions.
Role-based access control (RBAC) [95] has a signicant impact on many ac-
cess control systems. In recent years, RBAC has been widely used in databases
system management and operating system products. RBAC is described in terms
of individual users being associated with roles as well as roles being associated
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with permissions (each permission is a pair of objects and operations). As such, a
role is associated with users and permissions. For the current extensive use of the
RBAC model in database systems, it is highly possible to analyze the access con-
trol model for privacy protection which supports purposes, conditions and obliga-
tions on the basis of the RBAC model. Based on RBAC, in this thesis, we have
developed a Role-involved Conditional Purpose-based Access Control (RPAC)
model, where access permission is a 3-tuple hObject; Operation;AccessPurposei
instead of 2-tuple hObject; Operationi and access purpose permission is assigned
to roles. In the RPAC model, users are required to explicitly state their access
purposes when they try to access data. Although this method is simple and
easy to implement it requires complete trust in terms of the identity of users
and thus, the overall privacy that the system is able to provide entirely relies on
the users' trust worthiness. To overcome this problem, we have also developed a
Conditional Role-involved Purpose-based Access Control (CPAC) model, where
access purpose permission is assigned to Conditional Roles (CR). Users dynami-
cally activate conditional roles in the CPAC model in accordance with the context
attributes during the access purpose.
1.1.2 Data Anonymization
Publishing health, nancial and personal information requires the data to be
anonymized that the privacy of individuals in the database is protected. Anonymity
is an important concept for privacy, and data anonymity is particularly crucial in
public databases such as census data or health records collected by government
agencies. Data anonymity can also be useful in the private sector, for exam-
ple when an organization wishes to allow third parties to access its customer
data. In such a case it cannot be guaranteed that the privacy policy of the data
will always be respected by the third parties. Thus, organizations must assure
customers'Privacy by removing all information that can link data items with
individuals.
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The traditional approach of de-identifying records is to remove identifying
elds such as social security number or name. However, recent research has
shown that a large fraction of the US population can be identied using non-key
attributes (called quasi-identiers) such as date of birth, gender and zip code
[18]. A recent approach addressing this diculty relies on the notion of the k-
anonymity model [17, 18]. In this approach, the data privacy is guaranteed by
ensuring that non-key attributes that leak information are suppressed or general-
ized so that, for every record in the modied table, there are at least (k 1) other
records that have exactly the same values for quasi-identiers. The k-anonymity
problem has recently drawn considerable interest from the research community
and a number of algorithms have been proposed [27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 105]. In this
thesis, we present a systematic clustering method for k-anonymization, where
clusters form in a systematic way. This method has a time complexity of O(n
2)
k
in the clustering stage, where n is the total number of records that contain in-
dividuals' privacy elements. The proposed systematic clustering method out-
performs the recent clustering based k-anonymization techniques. However the
k-anonymity model may reveal sensitive information under two types of attacks,
namely the homogeneity attack and the background knowledge attack [40]. To
overcome this problem, we propose an enhanced systematic clustering method for
the l-diversity model that assumes that every group of indistinguishable records
contains at least l distinct sensitive attributes values.
1.1.3 Statistical Disclosure Control
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC) in databases, also known as Inference con-
trol, is about protecting data so they can be published without revealing con-
dential information that can be linked to specic individuals to whom the data
correspond [3]. This is an important application in several areas, such as ocial
statistics, health statistics and e-commerce (sharing of consumer data). Since
data protection ultimately means data modication, the challenge for SDC is to
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modify data in such a way that sucient protection is provided while keeping at
a minimum information loss, i.e., the loss of accuracy sought by database users.
Given an original microdata set V , the purpose of microdata (individual data)
SDC is to release a protected microdata set V
0
in such a way that:
 Disclosure risk (i.e., the risk that a user or an intruder can use V 0 to de-
termine condential attributes on a specic individual among those in V )
is low.
 User analyses (regressions, means, etc.) on V 0 and on V yield the same or
at least similar results.
Microaggregation is a family of SDC techniques for continuous microdata.
The rationale behind microaggregation is that condentiality rules in use allow
publication of microdata sets if records correspond to groups of k or more in-
dividuals, where no individual dominates the group and k is a threshold value
[8]. Strict application of such condentiality rules leads to replacing individual
values with values computed on small aggregates (microaggregates) prior to pub-
lication. To obtain microaggregates in a microdata set with n records, these are
combined to form g groups of size at least k. For each attribute, the average
value over each group is computed and is used to replace each of the original av-
eraged values. Groups are formed using a criterion of maximal similarity. Once
the procedure has been completed, the resulting records can be published. The
optimal k-partition is dened to be the one that maximizes within-group ho-
mogeneity; the higher the within group homogeneity, the lower the information
loss. Since microaggregation replaces values in a group by the group centriod, the
sum of squares criterion is common to measure homogeneity in clustering. The
within-groups sum of squares SSE is dened as
SSE =
gX
i=1
niX
j=1
(xij   xi)0(xij   xi) (1.1)
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The lower the SSE, the higher the within-group homogeneity. Thus, in terms
of sums of squares, the optimal k-partition is the one that minimizes SSE. For a
microdata set consisting of p attributes, these can be microaggregated together or
partitioned into several groups of attributes. The challenge in microaggregation
is to form the groups such that the within-group homogeneity is at a maximum.
Several taxonomies are possible to classify the microaggregation algorithms in the
literature: i) xed group size [6, 112, 113] versus variable group size [3, 8, 11, 112,
116, 117]; ii) exact optimal (only for the univariate case, [10, 13]) versus heuristic
microaggregation; iii) continuous versus categorical microaggregation [19].
In this thesis, at rst we propose a systematic clustering-based microaggre-
gation method for SDC. The algorithm of systematic clustering is sometimes af-
fected by extreme values. To overcome this problem, we propose another heuristic
approach, called the pairwise systematic (P-S) microaggregation method to min-
imize the information loss. Both the algorithms are applicable for a multivariate
xed group size microaggregation on unprojected continuous data. Finally we
propose a median based microaggregation method, where centroid is considered
as median. The new method guarantees that the microaggregated data and the
original data have the same distribution. The similarity of the data is conducted
by using a statistical non-parametric test.
1.2 Objectives of the Thesis
Although the recent privacy-related regulations have made many organizations
aware of the importance of privacy protection, such regulations are not the only
incentive for organizations to protect individuals' privacy. For many businesses,
especially e-commerce, consumers' concern for privacy is directly translated to a
huge nancial loss. A survey report from Forrester Research [66] states that in-
dividual privacy concerns reduced 15 billion dollars in e-commerce in 2001 alone.
This thesis aims to help develop a comprehensive privacy-preserving DBMS. Some
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eorts have already been reported that deal with a DBMS specically tailored
to support privacy policies. Although some follow-up eort has been made, the
development of a privacy-preserving DBMS is still at a very preliminary stage.
It is important to notice that a privacy-preserving DBMS may have to be com-
bined with collected tools, such as a data anonymizer and metadata manager,
in order to provide comprehensive platforms to support exible and articulated
privacy-preserving information management. The main objective of this thesis
is to develop models and techniques for building a privacy-preserving DBMS in
this regard. To investigate this, I will focus on three major tasks in a privacy
preserving DBMS in my PhD research:
 Purpose-based access control;
 Data anonymisation;
 Microaggregation in SDC.
1.3 Organization of the Thesis
The thesis consists of eight chapters with three parts. Their precedence order is
outlined and illustrated in Figure 1.2.
In the rst part of this thesis, we address the issue of data privacy by de-
veloping access control techniques. In Chapter 2, we introduce the Conditional
Purpose-based Access Control (CPBAC) model, which directly addresses the is-
sue of individuals' control over their personal data. The CPBAC model can
extract more information from data providers while at the same time assuring
privacy. The key characteristic of the CPBAC model is that it allows users to use
some data with certain conditions, and that multiple purposes can be associated
with each data element. It exploits query modication techniques to support
data access control based on the conditional purpose information. In Chapter 3,
we inject the CPBAC with the conventional well known RBAC, as RBAC has
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Introduction Chapter 1
Part I
Access Control
Part II
Data Anonymization
Part III
Statistical Disclosure Control
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Injecting CPBAC
with RBAC
Systematic Clustering
for k-Anonymization
Systematic Micro-
aggregation for SDC Microaggregation
A Pairwise-
Systematic
Median-based
Microaggregation
for SDC
Conclusion and Future Work
Figure 1.2: The structure of the thesis
been widely used in database system management and operating system prod-
ucts. Chapter 3 consists of two parts. In Section 3.2, we present a role-involved
purpose-based access control (RPAC) model, where users are required to explic-
itly state their access purposes when they try to access data. In Section 3.3, we
present a conditional role-involved purpose-based access control (CPAC) model,
where users dynamically activate conditional roles in accordance with the context
attributes. Based on the conditional role, access permissions are assigned that
represent what can be accessed, and for what purpose, to roles under certain
conditions.
In Part II, we address the issue of data privacy by developing ecient data
anonymization techniques. We propose an ecient systematic clustering method
for the k-anonymization in Chapter 4. The proposed technique adopts group sim-
ilar data together and then anonymizes each group individually. We also extend
this approach to the l-diversity model in this Chapter that assumes that every
group of indistinguishable records contains at least l distinct sensitive attribute
values.
In the last part of this thesis (Part III), we address the issue of data privacy
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by developing microaggregation methods in SDC. In Chapter 5, we develop the
systematic microaggregation method for SDC. In order to capture outliers in a
dataset, we present a pairwise systematic (P-S) microaggregation method to min-
imize the information loss in Chapter 6. The proposed technique in this chapter
adopts simultaneously two distant groups at a time with the corresponding sim-
ilar records together in a systematic way and then anonymizes with the centroid
of each group individually. Finally we present a median-based microaggregation
method in Chapter 7, where the centroid is considered as the median. The new
method guarantees the microaggregated data, and the original data are similar
by using a statistical test. Another contribution of this chapter is that we propose
a distance metric, called absolute deviation from median (ADM) to evaluate the
amount of mutual information among records in microdata. Finally, conclusions
and future work are indicated in Chapter 8.
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Part I
Access Control
Chapter 2
Conditional Purpose-based
Access Control
Data is collected for certain purposes. In order to protect information privacy,
the notion of purpose must play a major role in an access control model. This
chapter presents a model for privacy preserving access control which is based on
a variety of purposes. Conditional purpose is applied along with allowed purpose
and prohibited purpose in the model.
2.1 Introduction
With the increasingly extensive application of information technologies in peo-
ple's daily life, Privacy preservation has become a challenging problem in the
eld of information security. Enterprises regularly collect customers' personal
identication information along with other attributes during any kind of mar-
keting activities. It is a natural expectation that the enterprise will use this
information for various purposes, which leads to concerns that the personal data
may be misused. Many enterprises collect, store and use huge amount of per-
sonal information. A study conducted by the Federal Trade Commission has
shown that 97 percent of websites were collecting at least one type of identifying
information such as name, e-mail address, or postal address of customers [56].
Privacy preservation in a data-mining environment has become a great concern
both for enterprises and individuals. As individuals are more concerned about
13
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their privacy, they are becoming more reluctant to carry out their businesses and
transactions online, and many organizations are losing a considerable amount of
potential prots [66]. Research has shown that on-line commerce was reduced by
US$15 billion in 2001 due to individual privacy concerns. These reactions from
individuals imitate an altering awareness about how data is managed. Therefore
without a clear compromise between individuals and enterprises, data quality and
data privacy cannot be achieved and many organizations are seriously thinking
about privacy issues of consumers. By demonstrating good privacy practices,
many businesses are now trying to build up solid trust with customers, thereby
attracting more customers [51]. Considering the privacy of customers, enterprise
has to develop a secure privacy policy to remove the fear of customers. Thus in
an internal management system, a reliable, ecient, eective and secure privacy
policy should be established depending on the customer's requirements.
A lot of work has been done in order to protect the privacy of individuals
and this has shown that the notion of purpose should be used as the basis for
access control for specifying a privacy policy [48, 49, 53, 54, 73, 79]. According
to Yang et al. [99], a privacy policy ensures that data can only be used for its
intended purpose (intended usage of data), and that an access purpose (intention
for accessing data objects) is compliant with the data's intended purpose. Dur-
ing the last few years, rapid technological developments especially in the eld of
information technology, have directed most attention and energy to the privacy
protection of Internet users. Unless customers' data are suitably protected, in-
dividuals' privacy can be breached revealing their personal information. On the
other hand, these collected data sets are the most important tools for a wide
range of studies. Again the data that is more protected usually loses data qual-
ity. Therefore, it is necessary to come with to a point where both data quality
and data privacy are achieved. Although a signicant number of works has been
developed in this area [48, 49, 53, 54, 73, 76, 79], research has yet to be done to
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Table 2.1: Hypothetical data base illustrating AIP and PIP
name age address income nameip ageip addressip incomeip
Alice 35 21, West St. 35000 hfGg; hfg; hfGg; hfGg;
TBA, QLD 4350 fgi fGgi fA, Sgi fMgi
Bob 29 45, Fay CT. 23000 hfGg; hfGg; hfGg; hfGg;
TBA, QLD 4350 fgi fMgi fA;Sgi fA, Mgi
Ron 56 20, Anita Dr. 56000 hfGg; hfGg; hfGg hfGg;
TBA, QLD 4350 fgi fMgi fA, Sgi fAgi
Jak 48 25, Wuth St. 48000 hfGg; hfGg; hfGg; hfGg;
25, Wuth St. 48000 fgi fMgi fAgi fA,Mgi
G=fGeneral purposeg, A=fAdmin purposeg, S=fShipping purposeg, P=fPurchase
purposeg, M=fMarketing purposeg, ip=fIntended purposeg=hAIP, PIPi
remove the dilemma between data quality and data privacy.
One of the most popular approaches for protecting private information is the
access control model. Access control is the process of limiting access to the
resources of a system only to authorized users, programs, processes, or other
systems [101]. Many privacy policy access control models have been proposed
in order to protect the privacy of consumers. Byun et al. [53, 54] pointed out
that privacy protection cannot be easily achieved by traditional access control
models as it focuses on which user is performing which action on which data
object. But a reliable privacy policy is concerned with which data object is used
for which purpose. For example, a typical privacy policy such as \we will collect
and use customer identiable information for billing purposes and to enable us
to anticipate and resolve problems with your service" does not specify who can
access the customer information, but only states that the information can be
accessed for the purpose of billing, customer service and possibly some analysis.
Another complexity of privacy protection is that the comfort level of data usage
varies from individual to individual. For example, some online consumers may
feel that it is acceptable to disclose their purchase history or browsing habits
in return for better service, such as site personalization [103]. Other customers,
however, may believe that such techniques violate their privacy. Thus the notion
of purpose must play a major role in access control models and an appropriate
metadata model must be developed to support such privacy centric access control
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models in order to protect data privacy. Byun et al. [54] developed an approach
that is based on intended purposes, which specify the intended usage of data, and
access purpose, and which in turn specify the purposes for which a given data
element is accessed. Usually, during the data collection procedure customers
are informed about the purposes of enterprises. Customers then decide whether
their information could be used or not for a certain purpose. That means data
providers are given an option for their data and for what purposes it may be
used. If an individual mentions that his/her data could not be used for a certain
purpose, then his/her information is not accessible for that purpose. Usually
data providers are reluctant to use any part of their information for any purposes
and so there is a possibility of losing information. However more information
can be extracted from data providers by providing more options of using their
information. It is possible to protect the privacy of individuals in this model,
but there is a shortcoming of information loss. An intended purpose is divided
(IP) into two parts: Allowed Intended Purposes (AIP) (explicitly allows to access
the data for a particular purpose) and Prohibited Intended Purpose (PIP) (data
access for particular purposes are never allowed). In order to recognize the model
clearly, suppose that a company uses consumers' data for the purpose of General,
Admin, Marketing and Shipping and consider the hypothetical database in Table
2.1.
In Table 2.1, the value of Alice's attribute incomeip is hfGg; fMgi, which
means that Alice's income could be used for the General purpose but would be
strictly prohibited to use for the Marketing purpose. If we take a query
SELECT name
FROM Table 2.1
FOR Marketing Purpose
it gives the name of Alice, Bob, Ron, Jak and if we have a query
SELECT name, age
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FROM Table 2.1
FOR Marketing Purpose
it returns nothing because prohibited intended purposes override the allowed
intended purposes. This model protects the privacy of consumers as it consid-
ers customers' requirements but it incurs more information loss. So a natural
question arise
\ Is it possible to extract information from PIP at least conditionally?"
The answer to this question is achieved in this chapter by adding a new term,
conditional purpose, to the intended purpose. In order to extract more data and
protect data privacy, conditional purpose plays a role in access control models. In
this chapter, we address this goal by presenting a model of purpose management,
which is a fundamental building block on which conditional purpose based access
control can be developed. Our proposed model is based on access purpose and
intended purpose. Both access purposes and intended purposes are specied with
respect to a hierarchical structure that organizes a set of purposes for a given
enterprise. A key feature of our proposed model is that it supports conditional
purpose and prohibited purpose, thus allowing users to specify that data should
be used conditionally or should not be used for a set of purposes.
Observing the challenges of privacy protection and the satisfaction of both
enterprises and customers, we need a better model to extract more information
from customers with privacy guarantees. To overcome this challenge, we propose
a new access control model called conditional purpose-based access control (CP-
BAC) model. The access control model enables extracting information from PIP
by giving conditions, which is called Conditional Intended Purpose (CIP). Our
proposed model is helpful for enterprises to establish an ideal privacy policy and
to manage data in a sensitive, eective and trustworthy way. It also helps policy
makers and experts in the data-mining environment.
CHAPTER 2. CONDITIONAL PURPOSE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 18
2.2 Related Work
This work is related to several topics in the area of privacy and security for
data management, namely privacy policy specication, privacy-preserving data
management systems and multilevel secure database systems. We now briey
discuss the most relevant approaches in these areas.
The most notable technique to protect privacy is the W3C's Platform for Pri-
vacy Preferences (P3P) that formally species privacy policy by service providers
[74]. P3P provides a way for a web site to encode its data collection in a machine-
readable format known as a P3P policy, which can be compared against a user's
privacy preferences [99]. Byun et al. [54] pointed out that P3P does not provide
any functionality to keep promises in the internal privacy practice of an enterprise.
Thus it can be said that a striking privacy policy with an inadequate enforcement
mechanism may place organizations at risk of reputation damage. The concept
of a Hippocratic database introduced by Agrawal et al. [48] amalgamates pri-
vacy protection in a relational database system. A Hippocratic database includes
privacy policies and authorizations that are associated with each attribute and
each user's the usage purpose(s) [50]. Agrawal et al. [48] presented a privacy
preserving database architecture called Strawman which based the access control
on the notion of purposes, and opened up database-level research about privacy
protection technologies. After that, purpose-based access control introduced by
Byun et al. [53, 54] and Yang et al. [99], ne grained access control introduced
by Agrawal et al. [49] and Rizvi et al. [78] are now widely used access control
models for privacy protection. In IT systems the proposed Enterprise Privacy
Authorization Language (EPAL) of IBM [67] is a language for writing enterprise
privacy policies to run data handling practices. An EPAL policy denes hier-
archies of data-categories, user-categories, and purpose [54]. A set of actions,
obligations, and conditions are also dened by an EPAL policy.
A lot of works on multilevel secure relational databases [52, 55, 94, 96] pro-
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vide many valuable insights for designing a ne-grained secure data model. In a
multilevel relational database system, every piece of information is classied into
a security level, and every user is assigned a security clearance [54]. LeFevre et al.
[73] proposed an approach to enforce privacy policy in a database setting. This
work focus on ensuring limited data disclosure, based on the premise that data
providers have control over who is allowed to see their personal data and for what
purpose. They introduced two models of cell-level limited disclosure enforcement
and suggested an implementation based on query modication techniques. Byun
et al. [54] present a comprehensive approach for a privacy preserving access con-
trol model. In their access control model, multiple purposes are to be associated
with each data element and also support explicit prohibitions. This model is
based on the notion of purpose as it plays a central role and is the basic concept
on which access decisions are made. Massacci et al. [75] pointed out that most
privacy-aware technologies use purpose as a central concept around which privacy
protection is built.
All of these works proposed dierent approaches to protect the privacy of indi-
viduals through dierent models without considering to extract more information.
Our aim is to preserve the privacy of individuals as well as extracting more infor-
mation. With this aim, in this chapter we propose a model that has signicantly
improved the work of Byun et al. [54]. It has improved in three dierent ways.
First, we introduce a conditional purpose in addition to explicit prohibitions that
make data providers more exible in giving information. Second, the enterprise
can publish an ideal privacy policy to manage data in a sensitive, eective and
trustworthy way, and third it reduces the information loss as it shows that we
can extract more information from data providers.
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2.3 Purpose, Access Purpose and Intended Pur-
pose
Data is collected for a certain purpose. For instance, for a nation wide demo-
graphic survey in Australia, data may be collected to know the socioeconomic
and demographic characteristics of all Australians. Each data access also serves
a certain purpose. So it is a natural expectation that a privacy policy should
be concerned about which data object is used for which purpose. Many authors
have indicated that purpose is a central part in many privacy preserving access
control model [48, 67, 73, 104].
2.3.1 Denition of Purpose
For preserving the privacy of customers, each and every data access must obey
the privacy policies on which customers have conditionally or unconditionally
agreed. A representative privacy policy for a data element includes purpose,
retention, condition and obligation. This means that the particular data element
can be conditionally or unconditionally accessed only for specic purposes with
certain conditions. The retention indicates how long the data element can be
reserved, and the obligation designates the actions that must be followed after
an access to the data element is approved. So purpose is the most interesting
thing to researchers as it directly shows how access to data elements has to be
controlled. P3P denes purpose as \the reason(s) for data collection and use" and
species a set of purposes [98]. In commercial surroundings purposes normally
have hierarchical associations among them; i.e., generalization and specialization
relationships. For instance, a group of purposes such as direct-marketing and
third party marketing can be represented by a more general purpose, marketing.
We borrow the purpose denition from [54].
Denition 2.3.1 (Purpose and Purpose Tree): A purpose describes the inten-
tions for data collection and data access. A set of purposes, denoted as !, is
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General-Purpose
Admin Shipping Marketing
Profiling Analysis Direct Third-Party
D-Email D-Phone T-Email T-Postal
Special-Offers Service-Updates
Purchase
Figure 2.1: Purpose Tree
Table 2.2: Hypothetical data base illustrating AIP, CIP and PIP
name age address income nameip ageip addressip incomeip
Alice 35 21, West St., 35000 hfGg; hfg; hfGg; hfGg
TBA, QLD 4350 fg; fgi fMg; fAgi fg; fA, Sgi fAg; fMgi
Bob 29 45, Fay CT., 23000 hfGg; hfGg; hfGg; hfGg;
TBA, QLD 4350 fg; fgi fMg; fgi fMg; fA, Sgi fMg; fAgi
Ron 56 20, Anita Dr., 56000 hfGg; hfGg; hfGg; hfGg;
TBA, QLD 4350 fg; fgi fMg; fgi fg; fA, Sgi fSg; fAgi
Jak 48 25, Wuth St., 48000 hfGg; hfGg; hfGg; hfGg;
TBA, QLD 4350 fg; fgi fMg; fgi fMg; fAgi fMg; fAgi
G=fGeneral purposeg, A=fAdmin purposeg, S=fShipping purposeg, P=fPurchase purposeg,
M=fMarketing purposeg, ip=fIntended purposeg=hAIP, CIP, PIPi
organized in a tree structure, referred to as Purpose Tree and denoted as 
,
where each node represents a purpose in ! and each edge represents a hierarchi-
cal relation between two purposes. Let ri; rj, be two purposes in 
. We say that
ri is an ancestor of rj (or rj is a descendent of ri ) if there exists a downward
path from ri to rj in 
. Figure 2.1 is an example of a purpose tree.
Purposes, depending on their association with objects and subjects, may be
called intended purposes or access purposes respectively.
Denition 2.3.2 (Access Purpose): An access purpose is an intension for ac-
cessing data objects, and it must be determined by the system when data access is
requested. So access purpose species the purpose for which a given data element
is accessed.
Denition 2.3.3 (Intended Purpose): An intended purpose is the specied us-
ages for which data objects are collected. That is, purpose is associated with
data and thus regulates data accesses as intended purpose.
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According to our approach an intended purpose consists of the following three
components.
Allowable Intended Purpose (AIP): This means that data providers explicitly
allow accessing the data for a particular purpose. For example data providers
may consider that their information can be used for marketing purposes without
any further restrictions.
Conditional Intended Purpose (CIP): This means that data providers allow
accessing the data for a particular purpose with some conditions. For example
data providers may consider that their income information can be used for mar-
keting purposes by hiding their personal identication information (e.g. id or
name) or their income data can be revealed through generalization. or only the
rst letter of a name can be used for marketing purposes.
Prohibited Intended Purpose (PIP): This means that data providers strictly
disallow accessing the data for a particular purpose. For example data providers
may consider that their income information cannot be used for marketing pur-
poses. In that case data a provider's income attribute is strictly prohibited to use
for marketing purposes. An example of how AIP, CIP and PIP work is illustrated
through a hypothetical database in Table 2.2.
So an intended purpose IP is a tuple hAIP;CIP; PIP i, where AIP  !,
CIP ! and PIP ! are three sets of purposes. The set of purposes implied
by IP, denoted by IP? and the set of conditional purposes, denoted by IP?c are
dened to be AIP#-CIPl-PIPl and CIP# -PIPl respectively, where
R#, is the set of all nodes that are descendants of nodes in R, including nodes
in R themselves,
R", is the set of all nodes that are ancestors of nodes in R, including nodes in
R themselves, and
Rl, is the set of all nodes that are either ancestors or descendants of nodes in
R, that is, Rl=R" [ R#.
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Denition 2.3.4 (Full Access Purpose Compliance): Let 
 be a purpose tree.
Let IP= hAIP;CIP; PIP i and AP be an intended purpose and an access purpose
dened over 
, respectively. AP is said to be compliant with IP according to 
,
denoted as AP(
IP, if and only if AP2 IP?.
Denition 2.3.5 (Conditional Access Purpose Compliance): Let 
 be a purpose
tree. Let IP= hAIP;CIP; PIP i and AP be an intended purpose and an access
purpose dened over 
, respectively. AP is said to be conditionally compliant
with IP according to 
, denoted as APc(
IP, if and only if AP2 IP?c .
The following example explains the denition of AIP, CIP and PIP.
Example 2.3.1 Suppose IP= hfAdmin, Directg; fThird-partyg; fD-mailgi, then
IP? = fAdmin, Proling, Analysis, D-Phoneg and IP?c = fThird-party, T-Email,
T-Postalg, where subscript c indicates that customers information can be used
for the purpose with some conditions.
2.3.2 Management of Intended Purpose
As discussed before, data providers are given three possible options to make use
of their data, namely AIP, CIP and PIP. The CPBAC model builds the pur-
pose hierarchy on both intended purpose and access purpose. When the user
passes a request, the access control engine would verify whether the access pur-
pose complies with the intended purposes of user's requested data, and permit
or conditionally permit the access if it does, or otherwise deny the request. The
key feature of this model is that it supports conditionally allowable and explicit
prohibitions and organizes purposes in a hierarchy structure. Suppose that data
providers are informed about the company's privacy policy which is compliant
with the existing privacy laws and at the time of data collection process data
providers already agreed with those policies. On the basis of purpose tree, privacy
laws and policies, intended purpose with three levels are specied. Depending on
CHAPTER 2. CONDITIONAL PURPOSE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL 24
Privacy Laws and Policies Purpose Tree
Intended Purposes (IP)
with three levels
Data collection+IP leveling
Customer data+
Privacy level+
Conditional records
Data+IP levels+
Conditional records
Figure 2.2: Intended Purpose Management
customer privacy level during the data collection process, intended purposes are
associated with each data element along with the conditional records as some
information will be disclosed conditionally. Finally, in the organization of the
intended management process, the system receives data along with IP levels and
all the conditional records. Thus, the privacy policy of each data item is prede-
termined and the intended purposes of data items are also predetermined. The
management of intended purpose is shown in Figure 2.2.
Example 2.3.2 Suppose a company has established the following privacy poli-
cies:
 We use your information for purchasing purposes. This is just to provide
services to you and to inform you of services that may suits you.
 We will disclose, conditionally disclose or will not disclose your information
to third parties (e.g. external organizations). However, we will disclose if
you allow us to do so.
 It is our policy not to make any use of the information of children under
thirteen years old.
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Table 2.3: Predetermined Intended Purposes
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Name hfGg; fTg; fgi hfGg; fg; fTgi hfGg; fg; fgi
Address hfGg; fTg; fgi hfGg; fg; fTgi hfGg; fg; fgi
Phone hfGg; fTg; fgi hfGg; fg; fTgi hfGg; fg; fgi
Age hfGg; fTg; fgi hfGg; fg; fTgi hfGg; fg; fgi
Income hfGg; fTg; fgi hfGg; fg; fTgi hfGg; fg; fgi
G=fGeneral purposeg, T=fThird-Partyg, =fNo restrictiong.
 Sometimes web server administrators may collect some data (not your pri-
vate information). We will not make any use of this information but the
administrators may use this to provide better service to you.
In Table 2.3, Group 3 represents customers who have given consent for third-
party marketing, Group 1 represents customers who have conditionally given
consent for third-party marketing and Group 2 represents customers who have
not given consent for third-party marketing.
2.4 Conditional Purpose-based Access Control
(CPBAC)
In the CPBAC model data providers are asked three possible options for usage
of each data item. Permissible usage means data providers allow use of their
data, prohibited means data providers do not allow use of their data and con-
ditional permissible usages means data providers conditionally allow use of their
data item. Consider Table 2.4 that describes the intended purpose, types of data
and possible data usages. For example, a data provider may select that his/her
name and address is permissible for Admin purposes, address is not permissi-
ble for Marketing purposes but income information is conditionally permissible
for Marketing purpose. That is, the data provider does not have any privacy
concerns about the name and address when it is used for the purpose of adminis-
tration, but great concerns about privacy of the address information (and so does
not want to disclose the address) when it is used for the purpose of marketing,
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Table 2.4: Intended purpose, data type and data usage type
Term Description Example
Intended Purpose Intended usage of data specied AIP, CIP, PIP
by data provider
Data item Types of data being collected Name, Age, Income
(i.e. attributes)
Data usage Type Types of potential data usage Marketing, Admin
(i.e. purpose)
Table 2.5: Conditional records and intended purposes
name age address income
AIP Alice 35 21, West St., TBA, QLD 4350 35000
CIP A 30-40 West St., TBA, QLD 4350 30000-40000
PIP ? ? ? ?
AIP Bob 29 45, Fay CT., TBA, QLD 4350 23000
CIP B 20-30 Fay CT., TBA, QLD 4350 20000-30000
PIP ? ? ? ?
AIP Ron 56 20, Anita Dr., TBA, QLD 4350 56000
CIP R 50-60 Anita Dr., TBA, QLD 4350 50000-60000
PIP ? ? ? ?
AIP Jak 48 25 Wuth St., TBA, QLD 4350 48000
CIP A 50-60 Wuth St., TBA, QLD 4350 40000-50000
PIP ? ? ? ?
? means data providers are reluctant of any usage of their
data items
but his/her income information can be used for marketing purpose with some
conditions. Here the term \conditions" means that data provider is ready to re-
lease his/her certain information for certain purposes by removing his/her name
or id or through generalization. This information is then stored in the database
along with the collected data, and access to the data is tightly governed according
to the data provider's requirements. By using the term condition, data providers
feel more comfortable to release their data. Table 2.5 shows conditional records
and intended purposes of the data providers in Table 2.2.
The design of intended purposes supports permissive, conditions and pro-
hibitive privacy policies. This construction allows more squash and exible poli-
cies in our model. Moreover, by using CIP and PIP, we can assure that data
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Access Purpose
Compliance Check Access Denied
Access Accepted Access conditionally Accepted
Intended purpose with
three levels (AIP, CIP, PIP)
Figure 2.3: CPBAC Model
access for particular purposes is allowed with some conditions or never allowed.
Note that an access decision is made based on the relationship between the ac-
cess purpose and the intended purpose of the data. Access is allowed only if
the access purpose is included in the implementation of the intended purpose; in
that case the access purpose is compliant with the intended purpose. The access
is accepted with conditions if the implementation of intended purpose includes
the access purpose with conditions; in this case we say that access purpose is
conditionally compliant with intended purpose. Access is denied if the imple-
mentation of the intended purpose does not include the access purpose, in this
case access purpose is not compliant with the intended purpose. Figure 2.3 shows
the structure of the CPBAC model. Suppose in the online marketing system an
enterprise collects name, age, address and income of customers along with other
information and the enterprise uses the customer's information for the purpose
of admin, shipping, purchase and marketing. Consider the hypothetical database
in Table 2.2.
In Table 2.2, the value of Alice's attribute incomeip is hfGg,fAg,fMgi which
means that Alice's income could be used for general purposes but is strictly
prohibited to be used for marketing purposes. It also means that Alice's income
could be used for admin purposes by hiding her personal identication information
or through generalization. Similarly, Bob, Ron and Jak's income information
could be used conditionally for marketing purposes but their income information
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is strictly prohibited for admin purpose.
2.5 Implementation
In our proposed model, users query the database using standard SQL statements.
In this dissertation we assume that each query is connected with a specic pur-
pose. The data accessible to each query varies depending on the data providers
agreement and the purpose of the query. For example, any query against Ta-
ble 2.2 with any purpose returns a result that is equivalent to the result of the
query. As our proposed model directly reect the information that is allowed,
conditionally allowed or prohibited by each data provider, querying against these
in the model does not violate privacy. This model is quite dierent from the
conventional access control model as dierent sets of data may be returned for
the same query depending on the purpose of the query and the data providers'
agreements. Thus from the hypothetical database in Table 2.2, if we take the
query
SELECT name, income
FROM Table 2.2
FOR Marketing Purpose,
then by using Table 2.5, we get the information in Table 2.6.
We can see from Table 2.6 that it gives name and income of Ron as he allows to
disclose his name and income information for marketing purpose. It also shows
two other incomes via generalization as they conditionally allowed to disclose
their income. This clearly shows the utility of using our proposed model. It
demonstrates that it can extract more information from data providers.
Theorem 2.5.1 Let p; q and r denote the probability that a data provider gives
consent for a particular attribute for AIP, PIP and CIP respectively. Assuming
that these probabilities remain the same from data provider to data provider,
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Table 2.6: Filtering information
Ron 56000
Bob 20000-30000
Jak 40000-50000
then the conditional based access control model extracts more information than
the model proposed by Byun et al. [54].
Proof Let n be the total number of data providers. If p and q are the probability
that a given data provider gives consent for a particular attribute for AIP and
PIP, then the average numbers of data providers who give consent for AIP is np.
That means by using the model of [54], the average number of data providers who
give consent for AIP of a particular attribute is np. If we use our model then the
average number of data providers who give consent to disclose their data for a
certain purpose with some conditions is nr. Therefore, by using the conditional
based access control model, the total average number of data providers whose
information is accessible is (np+nr). Since n and p are both positive, (np+nr) is
always greater than np. This means that it is possible to extract more information
from customers by using the conditional based access control model.
In our model, the collected data is used for dierent purposes on the basis of
the data providers requirements. By using the CIP, both privacy and usability
of data can be achieved as it lters out the values by performing a purpose com-
pliance. Using a hypothetical database and the extracted outcome in Table 2.6,
shows clearly that the data utility and data providers information is protected.
Theorem 2.5.1 shows that our proposed model extracts more information while
assuring privacy.
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Table 2.7: Pt-table
p id p name parent code aip code cip code pip code
1 A - 0200 03FF 0c3FF 03FF
2 B 1 0100 0130 0c130 0330
3 C 1 0080 0080 0c080 0280
4 D 1 0040 004F 0c04F0 024F
5 E 2 0020 0020 0c020 0320
6 F 2 0010 0010 0c010 0310
7 G 4 0008 000B 0c00B 024B
8 H 4 0004 0004 0c004 0244
9 I 7 0002 0002 0c002 024A
10 J 7 0001 0001 0c001 0249
subscript c is used to make a dierence between aip code and cip code.
2.6 Access control
Among the various possible techniques to determine access purpose, in this chap-
ter we utilize the method where the users are required to explicitly state their
access purposes when they try to access data. That is, users provide an access
purpose for each query they issue.
2.6.1 Compliance Check
Consider the purpose tree in Figure 2.1 and its encoding into a relation pt-table
as shown in Table 2.7. The rst column p id represents the identication number
of each purpose node, the second column p name represents the name of each
purpose node, and the third column parent is used to capture the hierarchical
relationships among purpose nodes. The column code is the binary encoding of
each purpose. For example, in Table 2.7 the purpose B is encoded as `0100'
in hexadecimal representation, while the purpose E is encoded as `0020' in
hexadecimal form. The last three columns aip code, cip code and pip code are
precalculated encodings of purpose implications. As we know, when a purpose
ri is used as an AIP, it means that every descendant of ri, including ri itself is
allowed. For example, the purpose D in Figure 2.4 used as an AIP implies that
access is allowed for the purpose of D as well as G, H, I and J. Thus, the aip code
of D contains the implied set of D, which is the sum of the encodings of D, G, H,
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Figure 2.4: Purpose Tree Storage
I and J. Note that aip code and cip code of each purpose is the same, as in the
long run both are allowed. The pip code of a particular purpose rj is computed
similarly by summing the encodings of every descendant and ancestor of rj with
the encoding of rj itself.
An access purpose is compliant with an intended purpose if and only if the
access purpose is not prohibited by PIP and it is allowed by both AIP and CIP.
Thus, the purpose compliance check can be done with two bitwise AND an op-
eration as follows:
Given the encodings of an access purpose1, AIP, CIP and PIP, say ap code,
aip code, cip code and pip code respectively, the access purpose is fully compli-
ant with the intended purpose if and only if
(ap code & pip code)=0^(ap code & aip code) 6=0
and the access purpose is conditionally compliant with the intended purpose
if and only if
(ap code & pip code)=0^(ap code & cip code) 6=0
where, & is bitwise AND operator, ^ is logical AND operator and _ is logical OR
operator. Conicts among the AIP, CIP and the PIP for the same data element
are resolved by applying the denial-takes-procedure policy where PIP overrides
1Access purposes are represented using the values in the code of the Pt-table
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AIP and CIP, and CIP overrides AIP. The computation for a purpose compliance
check is illustrated in Table 2.8.
2.6.2 Query modication
It is a natural expectation that privacy-preserving access control techniques en-
sure a query result containing only the data items that are allowed or conditionally
allowed or completely prohibited for the access purpose of the query. This expec-
tation is achieved in this chapter using query modication [97]. It is important
to note that query modication provides powerful and exible controls without
requiring any alteration in the underlying mechanisms and that it is supported in
a major commercial Data Base Management System [77]. Our query modication
algorithm is outlined in Table 2.8.
The complexity of our query modication algorithm is in O(n), where n is the
number of attributes accessed by a given query. The method Modifying Query is
invoked only if the access purpose of the query is veried to be acceptable by the
validate function. If the access purpose is unacceptable, then the query is rejected
without further being processed. The query modication algorithm checks both
the attributes referenced in the projection list and the attributes referenced in
predicates. As the attributes in the projection list determine what data items will
be included in the result relation of a query, it may seem enough to enforce privacy
policy based only on the attributes in the projection list. However, the result of
a query also depends on the predicates, and not enforcing privacy constraints
on the predicates may introduce inference channels. The abounding algorithm
lters out a tuple if any of its elements that are accessed are conditionally allowed
or prohibited with respect to the given access purpose. For example, consider a
query,
SELECT name, income, address
FROM Table 2.2
FOR Marketing Purpose.
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Suppose there is a customer record of which name is allowed for marketing, and
income is conditionally allowed for Marketing but the address is prohibited for
this purpose, then our algorithm only excludes the address of this record from the
query result, and income information is visible anonimyzing the customer's name
or income information that is revealed via generalisation. Therefore, according
to our proposed model, income information of this customer is still usable for
marketing purposes instead of excluding other records.
The following example illustrates how our algorithm modies queries. This
example is a revised version of [54] where purpose encoding of marketing is as-
sumed to be `0200'. For the query
SELECT name, income
FROM table 2.2
FOR Marketing Purpose,
there are two modied queries, one for accessing allowable data items as follows:
SELECT name, income
FROM Table 2.2
WHERE Comp Check1('0200', name aip, name pip)
AND Comp Check1('0200', income aip, income pip).
and the other for conditionally allowable data items as follows:
SELECT name, income
FROM Table 2.2
WHERE Comp Check2('0c200', name cip, name pip)
AND Comp Check2('0c200', income cip, income pip).
2.7 Comparison
There is some related work on privacy preservation. The closest works related
to this article are Hippocratic databases [48] and purpose based access control
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Table 2.8: Query Modication Algorithm
Comp Check1 (ap, aip, pip)
/? This function is required for query modication ?/
Returns Boolean
1. if (ap & pip)6== 0 then
2. return False; 3. else if (ap & aip)0 then
4. return False;
5. end if;
6. return True
Comp Check2 (ap, cip, pip)
1. if (ap & pip)6== 0 then
2. return False; 3. else if (ap & cip)0 then
4. return False;
5. end if;
6. return True
Modifying Query (Query Q)
Returns a modied privacy-preserving query Q
1. Let R1,   , Rn be the relations referenced by Q
2. Let P be the predicates in WHERE clause of Q
3. Let a1,   ,am be the attributes referenced in both
the projection list and P
4. Let AP be the access purpose encoding of Q
5.
6. for each Ri where i=1,.,n do
7. for each aj which belongs to Ri do
8. if (Comp Check1 (AP, Ri.aip, Ri.pip)=False) then
9. return ILLEGAL-QUERY;
10. end if;
11. end for;
12. else if (Comp Check2 (AP, Ri.cip, Ri.pip)=False) then
13. return ILLEGAL-QUERY;
14. end if;
15. end for;
16. return Q without modied P;
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model [54]. In this section we will compare our proposed model with these two
models.
Agrawal et al. [48] proposed Hippocratic databases that incorporate privacy
protection within a relational database system. The proposed technique uses
privacy metadata, which consist of privacy policies and privacy authorizations
stored in two tables. The authors proposed a strawman design for Hippocratic
databases. This design identied the technical challenges and problems in design-
ing such databases. But the authors did not consider the concept of purpose. By
contrast, in our proposed model we investigated a more sophisticated concept of
purpose. We used conditional purpose and the association of dierent purposes
with a data element which are not considered in their work.
Byun et al. [54] provided a comprehensive framework for purpose and data
management. They argued that in order to protect data privacy, the notion of
purpose must play a major role in the access control model. The authors pro-
posed approach is based on intended purposes, which specify the intended usage
of data, and access purposes, which specify the purposes for which a given data
element is accessed. They also argued that traditional access control models fo-
cus on which user is performing which action on which data objects but privacy
policies are concerned with which data object is used for which purposes. The
authors proposed a purpose based access control model (PBAC) that allows mul-
tiple purposes to be associated with each data element and also supports explicit
prohibitions. Although their proposed model is designed on the basis of customers
requirements and so does not violate privacy, the main drawback of this model
is the information loss. In that model, customers are given only two options,
whether their private data can be used or not for certain purposes, instead of
giving more possible options. However, we strongly believe that by giving more
options to customers data extractions can be easily achieved. Thus the proposed
model in this chapter provides three more options that help enterprises to extract
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more information from customers, while still assuring privacy. This criterion is
achieved theoretically by Theorem 2.5.1 in Subsection 2.5. This clearly shows the
utility and usability of our proposed model in an eective and trustworthy way.
2.8 Conclusion
Although privacy preserving desires a secure infrastructure and relies on access
control technology, it is not a security problem but it is related to a data man-
agement problem. Purpose plays a signicant role in the eld of database man-
agement system privacy preserving techniques. In this chapter we introduced a
conditional purpose-based access control (CPBAC) model for privacy protection
in the database system that enables enterprises to operate as reliable keepers
of their customers' data. The basic concepts of the proposed conditional based
access control model are discussed and the possibility has been shown to ex-
tract more information from customers by providing a secure privacy policy. The
study reveals that this model achieves better progress than the other access con-
trol models in the area of privacy preserving in a data mining environment. We
also discussed the algorithm to achieve the compliance check between access pur-
pose and intended purposes. The eect of the proposed access control model can
be extremely useful for internal access control within an organization as well as
for information sharing between organizations.
Our proposed approach provides a complete structure for a privacy preserving
access control model. On the basis of this approach, we extend this model in
Chapter 3 in the Role-based Access Control (RBAC) model.
Chapter 3
Injecting CPBAC with RBAC
Role-based access control (RBAC) has been widely used in database system man-
agement and operating system products because of its signicant impact on ac-
cess control systems. In Chapter 2 we proposed a conditional purposed-based
access control (CPBAC) model for privacy protection in a relational database
system. In this chapter we inject CPBAC with the conventional well known
RBAC. This chapter consists of two parts. In the rst part we present a role-
involved purpose-based access control (RPAC) model and in the second part we
present a conditional role-involved purpose-based access control (CPAC), where
a conditional purpose is dened as the intention of data access or usages under
certain conditions. The work presented in this chapter extends role-based access
control models to a further coverage of privacy preservation in database manage-
ment systems by adopting purposes and conditional intended purposes and to
achieve a ne grained access control. The work in this chapter helps enterprises
to circulate a clear privacy promise, and to collect and manage user preferences
and consent.
3.1 Introduction
Access control is one of the most popular approaches for protecting private in-
formation. It is the process of limiting access to the resources of a system only
to authorized users, programs, processes, or other systems [101]. Role based
37
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access control (RBAC) proposed by Sandhu et al. [95] has been widely used
in database system management and operating system products because of its
signicant impact on access control systems. RBAC is described in terms of in-
dividual users being associated with roles as well as roles being associated with
permissions (each permission is a pair of objects and operations). As shown in
Figure 3.1, a role is associated with users and permissions. A user in this model
is a human being and a role is a job function or job title within the organization
associated with its authority and responsibility. The RBAC model also includes
a role hierarchy, a partial order dening a relationship between roles, to facilitate
the administration tasks.
In Chapter 2, we developed a conditional purpose-based access control (CP-
BAC) model [68] that can extract more information from data providers while
at the same time assuring privacy. The key characteristic of the CPBAC model
is that it allows users to use some data with certain conditions, and multiple
purposes can be associated with each data element. It exploited query modi-
cation techniques to support data access control based on conditional purpose
information. However, RBAC is one of the most popular approaches towards
access control to achieve database security and is available in many database
management systems, so it needs to be addressed in CPBAC. To implement this,
we need to expand the CPBAC model with the conventional well-known RBAC.
Such an extension of CPBAC with roles which we refer to in the role-involved
purpose-based access control (RPAC) model presented in this chapter. Both ac-
cess purposes and intended purposes are specied with respect to a hierarchical
structure that organizes a set of purposes for a given enterprise.
The importance of privacy preservation has been recognized for a long time,
but the concept of privacy has not been supported in RBAC models [95, 102]. A
security ocer has to assign and check privacy issues if a role is associated with
private information. Such a model signicantly increases the management eorts
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Figure 3.1: Role-based access control model
in a decentralized environments because of the variable private information with
dierent individuals and the continuous involvement from security ocers. This
chapter provides a bridge of the gap between private preserving techniques and
RBAC models.
As mentioned before, Our previous work in Chapter 2 exploited query modi-
cation techniques to support data access control based on the conditional purpose
information[68] which is not associated with the role-based access control model.
However, it is important to analyse access purposes with the RBAC model. For
example, suppose the RBAC model is used in a university environment. Stu-
dents and sta are two roles in the model. Chris, as a student, allows people
to use her private information such as home address and home phone for mar-
keting purposes in the university environment. It means the home address and
phone cannot be used in other environments except the university and hence the
university environment is a condition.
In this chapter we utilize RBAC which supports conditional purposes into
our model. Thus the proposed RPAC model in this chapter has the following
features:
 It satises data providers' requirements and allows users to use data with
conditions. The data provider expresses their own privacy preferences
through setting the intended purpose with three levels (AIP, CIP and PIP),
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while the data owner is responsible for working out the policies for autho-
rization of access purpose.
 Its algorithm utilizes RBAC to achieve the compliance computation between
access purpose and intended purpose.
 It extracts more information from data providers by providing more possible
options of using their information assuring privacy of private information
which maximizes the usability of data.
 It determines the compliance computation between access purpose and in-
tended purpose. Intended purposes are associated with the requested data
objects during the access decision in the well-designed hierarchy of private
metadata.
3.2 Role-involved CPBAC (RPAC)
The RBAC model is a landmark in the eld of access control models and has be-
come a NIST standard [95]. RBAC has been proposed as an alternative approach
to discretionary access control (DAC) and mandatory access control (MAC)1
both to simplify the task of access control management and to directly support
function-based access control. It is preliminary designed to satisfy the need of
simplifying the authorization management and directly presenting access control
policies [100]. The key concept of the RBAC model is role which represents a
certain job function or job title within the organization. The permission of per-
forming certain operations on certain data is assigned to roles instead of single
users. Users are thus simply authorized to play the appropriate roles, thereby
acquiring the roles authorizations. When the user makes a request, the system
activates specic roles predened for him/her. Thus he/she gains the permission
of operating directly or indirectly from roles, which considerably simplies the
1MAC and DAC do not handle environments in which the originators of documents retain
control over them even after their dissemination.
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authorization management. Because roles represent organizational functions, an
RBAC model can directly support security policies of the organization. In the
recent development of the privacy preserving data mining environment many re-
searchers have recognised the importance of purpose, but in the RBAC model
purpose is not yet fully investigated. Based on RBAC, the CPAC model extends
mainly to the following aspects.
 The access permission is no longer a 2-tuple hObject; Operationi, but a
3-tuple hObject; Operation;AccessPurposei which is called the access pur-
pose permission.
 The access purpose permission is assigned to roles and after the purpose
compliance process, only the objects which are purpose compliant or con-
ditionally compliant can be returned to the users.
In the RPAC model, the entity User is dened as a human being, a machine,
a process, or an intelligent autonomous agent. The entity Role represents the
working function or working title assigned within the organization according to
dierent authorities and obligations. Roles are created for the various job func-
tions in an organization and users are assigned roles based on their authority and
qualications. Users can be easily reassigned from one role to another. Roles can
be granted new permissions as new applications and systems are incorporated
and permission can be revoked from roles as needed. The entity Object stands
for the data which the user requests and can be abstracted as a data set. The
entity operation signies a certain action that the user wants to perform on the
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object. The entity Purpose represents all the possible access purposes in the
system and IP signies the intended purposes with three levels (AIP, CIP, PIP)
attached to each data object. Permission is an approval of a particular operation
to be performed on one or more objects. The RPAC model is illustrated in Figure
3.2. The formalized denition of the RPAC model is shown as follows:
Denition 3.2.1 (RPAC model):
 User, Role, Operation, Object, Purpose represent the set of users, roles,
operations, objects and purposes.
 IP=fhaip; cip; pipijaip  !; cip  !; pip  !g is the set of the object's
intended purposes, where aip signies the object's permitted intended pur-
pose, cip is the conditionally permitted intended purpose and pip represents
the object's forbidden intended purposes [68].
 R=frjr 2 Roleg is the set of roles.
 APP=fho; opt; apijo 2 Object; opt 2 Operation; ap 2 Purposeg is the set
of access purpose permissions.
 IPL=fho; ipijo 2 Object; ip 2 IPg represents the set of data objects and
their predened intended purpose.
 RH  RoleRole is a partial order on roles, called the inheritance relation-
ship among roles. We also dene a partial order  which is the transitive
closure of RH. For example, r1  r2 means r1 inherits all permissions of r2.
Figure 3.3 is an example of role hierarchies of the Marketing department
for a hypothetical company.
 PT  Purpose  Purpose is a partial order on purposes (generalization/
specialization) shown in the purpose tree. Figure 2.1 is an example of
purpose tree.
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Figure 3.3: Example of Role Hierarchies in Marketing department
 User Assignment UA  User  Role is a many-to-many mapping relation
between users and their assigned roles.
 Access Purpose Permission Assignment APPA  Role APP is a many-
to-many mapping relation between roles and access purpose permissions.
It signies the action that a certain role performs on a certain object on a
certain access purpose.
 Purpose Compliance PC  APP ./ IPL is a one-to-one relation between
each access purpose permission and data object as well as its predened
intended purposes.
Now we are at the stage to provide function denitions to facilitate the discussion
of the RPAC model.
 assigned role : User ! 2Role, the mapping of a user u onto a set of roles.
Formally,
assigned role(u) = fr 2 Rolejhu; ri 2 UAg
 assigned access purpose permission : Role ! 2APP , the mapping of a
role r onto access purpose permissions. Formally,
assigned access purpose permission(r) = fapp 2 APP jhapp; ri 2 APPAg.
 Purpose binding : Object ! IP , the mapping of a data object o onto
intended purposes ip with three levels, which means nding the bound
intended purposes of the object.
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 Purpose compliance : AP  IP ! fTrue; Conditionally True; Falseg,
is used to determine the compliance between the access purpose and the
object's intended purposes [68]. Formally,
Purpose compliance(ap; ip)=True if ap 2 IP ?,
Purpose compliance(ap; ip)=Conditionally True if ap 2 IP ?c .
In the RPAC model, the users are required to explicitly state their access pur-
pose(s) when they try to access data. That is, the users present an access purpose
for each query they issue. During the access decision process, the system combines
the requested data with its intended purposes according to privacy metadata and
sends the data whose intended purposes are fully compliant or conditionally com-
pliant with the access purpose to the requester. As the model respects customers
requirement regarding their data usages and also support RBAC, it prevents
private information from disclosure.
3.2.1 Authorization and Authentication
Access purpose is the reason for accessing a data item and it must be determined
by the system when a data access is requested. There are dierent possible meth-
ods for determining the access purpose [54]. First, users can be required to state
their access purpose explicitly along with requests for data access. Most privacy
policy access control models are based on this method. Second, the system reg-
isters a special access purpose for each application or stored procedure. This
method however can not be used for complex applications or stored-procedures
for the reason that requesters may access data objects for multiple access pur-
poses. Lastly, access purposes can be dynamically determined based on attributes
of users and the context of the system in addition to requested objects and ac-
tions. However, the key challenge for implementing this method is that it may be
dicult to infer the access purposes both accurately and eciently [54]. Among
the various possible techniques to determine access purpose, in this chapter we
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utilize the method where the users are required to explicitly state their access
purposes when they try to access data.
In this model, access purposes are authorized to users through roles. Users are
required to state their access purposes along with their queries and the system
conrms the stated access purposes by ensuring that the users are indeed allowed
to access data for the particular purposes they identied. Now we formally dene
access purpose authorization and its authentication.
Denition 3.2.2 (Access Purpose Authorization)
Let 
 be a purpose tree and ! be the set of purposes in 
. Also let R be the set
of roles dened in a system. An access purpose is authorized to a specic set of
users by a pair hap; ri, where ap is a access purpose in ! and r is a role dened
over R.
Usually in the typical situation, roles and access purpose are organized in a
hierarchical structure. All users authorized for a role ri are also authorized for
any role rj where ri  rj. Thus, activating a role ri automatically activates all
roles rj, such that ri  rj. Similarly, authorizing an access purpose ap for a
role ri implies that the users belonging to ri (or the users belonging to rj, where
ri  rj) are authorized to access data with ap as well as all the descendants of ap
in the purpose tree. The access purpose authentication denition below connes
the implications of access purpose authorizations.
Denition 3.2.3 (Access Purpose Authentication):
Let 
 be a purpose tree, ! be the set of purposes in 
 and R be the set of roles
dened in a system. Suppose that an access purpose ap and a role ri is activated
by a user u. We say that ap is legitimate for u under ri if there exists an access
purpose authorization hapl; rii, where apl in ! and ri is a role dened over R such
that ap 2 Descendants (apl) and the users belong to role ri (or any descendants
role of ri.)
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Table 3.1: Intended purposes table
Sl No. Table ID Table Name Cus ID Attr Name Intended Purpose
1 1 Customer info 22 Customer Name hfGeneralg; fAdming;
fShippinggi
2 1 Customer info 25 Income hfMarketingg; fAdming;
fShippinggi
3 1 Customer info 52 Address hfShippingg; fAdming;
fMarketinggi
Consider the purpose tree in Figure 2.1 and the role hierarchies of a Marketing
department for a hypothetical company in Figure 3.3. Suppose that access pur-
pose \Service-Updates" are assigned to the \E-Marketing" role, then the users
who activate the role \E-Marketing" (or the two descendants roles) can access
data for the purpose of \Service-Updates".
By accessing purpose authorization and authentication, users get access pur-
pose permission from access the control engine. Now it is necessary to check
whether users' access purposes are fully or conditionally compliant with data's
intended purpose for the access decision. In the following section we discuss the
compliance computation for access decision.
3.2.2 Access Decision
Usually data providers (customers) are reluctant for any use of their information.
On the other hand, data users (enterprisers) want to make use of the collected
data as much as possible. Therefore, a negotiating process is necessary between
these two parties in order to protect privacy. Again the comfort level of privacy
varies from individual to individual.
In our model customers are given three more possible options of using their
data. These make them comfortable to release their data fully or conditionally
and the private information will be protected. After data are collected, intended
purposes with three dierent levels will be associated with data. As the intended
purpose is assigned to every data element, an intended purposes table (IPT) is
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Figure 3.4: Compliance computation and access decision algorithm
Table 3.2: Customer info Table with AIP, CIP and PIP
name age address income nameip ageip addressip incomeip
Alice 35 21, West St., TBA, 35000 hfGg; fg; hfGg; fMg; hfGg; fg; hfGg; fAg;
QLD 4350 fgi fAgi fA, Sgi fMgi
Bob 29 45, Fay CT., TBA, 23000 hfGg; fg; hfGg; fMg; hfGg; fMg; hfGg; fMg;
QLD 4350 fgi fgi fA, Sgi fAgi
Ron 56 20, Anita Dr., TBA, 56000 hfGg; fg; hfGg; fMg; hfGg; fg; hfGg; fSg;
QLD 4350 fgi fgi fA, Sgi fAgi
Jak 48 25, Wuth St., TBA, 48000 hfGg; fg; hfGg; fMg; hfGg; fMg; hfGg; fMg;
QLD 4350 fgi fgi fAgi fAgi
G=fGeneral purposeg, A=fAdmin purposeg, S=fShipping purposeg, P=fPurchase
purposeg, M=fMarketing purposeg, ip=fIntended purposeg=hAIP, CIP, PIPi,
=fNo restrictiong.
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Table 3.3: Conditional records and intended purposes for Table 3.2
name age address income
AIP Alice 35 21, West St., TBA, QLD 4350 35000
CIP A 30-40 West St., TBA, QLD 4350 30000-40000
PIP ? ? ? ?
AIP Bob 29 45, Fay CT., TBA, QLD 4350 23000
CIP B 20-30 Fay CT., TBA, QLD 4350 20000-30000
PIP ? ? ? ?
AIP Ron 56 20, Anita Dr., TBA, QLD 4350 56000
CIP R 50-60 Anita Dr., TBA, QLD 4350 50000-60000
PIP ? ? ? ?
AIP Jak 48 25 Wuth St., TBA, QLD 4350 48000
CIP A 40-50 Wuth St., TBA, QLD 4350 40000-50000
PIP ? ? ? ?
? means information will not be disclosed.
formed. Consider a typical IPT table in Table 3.1 which consists of six columns,
where Sl No is the serial number, Table ID is the identication of the original
table, Cus ID is the hidden attribute which is added when tables are created,
Table Name is the name of the table in the database and Attr Name is the
attribute name in the table. Thus the storage of intended purposes and data is
separated. Data providers (customers) are able to control the release of their data
by adding privacy levels into the IPT which will not aect data in the database.
After authorizing access purpose, users get access purpose permission from
the access control engine. When data providers submit data, intended purposes
with three dierent levels are dened. The access control engine needs a match
process to nish the compliance computation fully or conditionally between ac-
cess purposes and intended purposes. If the requester's access purpose is fully
compliant with the intended purposes of requested data, the engine will release
full data to the requester. On the other hand, if the access purpose is condition-
ally compliant, the engine will release conditional data to the requester, otherwise
returned data will be null. Thus in this model the search engine needs to evaluate
two compliance checks, the rst one is for full compliance and the second one is
for conditional compliance. The compliance computation and the access decision
CHAPTER 3. INJECTING CPBAC WITH RBAC 49
Table 3.4: IPT table
Sl No. Table ID Table Name Cus ID Attr Name Intended Purpose
1 3.2 Customer info 1 Alice hfGg; fg; fgi
2 3.2 Customer info 1 age hfGg; fMg; fAgi
3 3.2 Customer info 1 address hfGg; fg; fA, Sgi
4 3.2 Customer info 1 iccome hfGg; fAg; fMgi
5 3.2 Customer info 2 Bob hfGg; fg; fgi
6 3.2 Customer info 2 age hfGg; fMg; fgi
7 3.2 Customer info 2 address hfGg; fMg; fA,Sgi
8 3.2 Customer info 2 income hfGg; fMg; fAgi
9 3.2 Customer info 3 Ron hfGg; fg; fgi
10 3.2 Customer info 3 age hfGg; fMg; fgi
11 3.2 Customer info 3 address hfGg; fg; fA, Sgi
12 3.2 Customer info 3 income hfGg; fSg; fAgi
13 3.2 Customer info 4 Jak hfGg; fg; fgi
14 3.2 Customer info 4 age hfGg; fMg; fgi
15 3.2 Customer info 4 address hfGg; fMg; fAgi
16 3.2 Customer info 4 income hfGg; fMg; fAgi
G=fGeneral purposeg, A=fAdmin purposeg, S=fShipping purposeg,
P=fPurchase purposeg, M=fMarketing purposeg, =fNo restrictiong.
algorithm of the model are illustrated in Figure 3.4. Method Comp Check re-
turns the result of the purpose compliance check (fully or conditionally) for the
given intended purpose with three levels as described in Section 3.2. The Method
Access Decision is based on the Comp Check and the Intended Purpose of a
particular attribute in the IPT table.
Table 3.5: Table return to Russell
name age address income
Alice 30-40 21, West St., TBA, QLD 4350 ?
Bob 20-30 Fay CT., TBA, QLD 4350 20000-30000
Ron 50-60 20, Anita Dr., TBA, QLD 4350 56000
Jak 40-50 Wuth St., TBA, QLD 4350 40000-50000
? means information will not be disclosed.
Consider a hypothetical customer info table in Table 3.2. This table is created
when data are collected and is based on the customer privacy preferences. Also
assume that conditional records and intended purposes for Table 3.2 are avail-
able in Table 3.3. Suppose that Russell is an employee working in the Marketing
deptaetment of a company and is trying to access customer info for Marketing
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purposes. Assume that the company is using the RBAC model for the privacy
preserving access control model and when Russell activated his role, he got ac-
cess purpose permission from the role for accessing customer info for Marketing
purpose. Based on the information in Table 3.2, the IPT Table for this example
is given in Table 3.4. Thus, according to the customer info table in Table 3.2
and the privacy level of customers associated with the intended purpose (IP), the
set of purposes and the set of conditional purposes implied by IP are given by
IP ?(Sl No: = 1)= AIP#-CIPl-PIPl =fAdmin, Purchase, Shipping, Mar-
keting, Proling, Analysis, Direct, Third-Party, D-Email, D-Phone, T-Email, T-
Postal, Special-Oers, Service-Updatesg.
IP ?c (Sl No: = 1)= CIP
# -PIPl=fg=fNullg.
IP ?(Sl No: = 2)=AIP#-CIPl-PIPl=fPurchase, Shippingg.
IP ?c (Sl No: = 2)=CIP
# -PIPl=fMarketing, Direct, Third-Party, D-Email,
D-Phone, T-Email, T-Postal, Special-Oers, Service-Updatesg.
IP ?(Sl No: = 3)=AIP#-CIPl-PIPl=fPurchase, Marketing, Direct, Third-
Party, D-Email, D-Phone, T-Email, T-Postal, Special-Oers, Service-Updatesg.
IP ?c (Sl No: = 3)=CIP
# -PIPl=fg=fNullg, and so on.
So, when Russell hands a query
SELECT name, age, address, income
FROM Table 3.2
FOR Marketing Purpose,
then by using the IPT table in Table 3.4 and the algorithm in Figure 3.4 to
perform the computation of the privacy protection access decision, the return
table to Russell will be in Table 3.5. From Table 3.5, it can be said that customers'
consent regarding the privacy level have been taken into account and the private
information is protected.
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Kabir and Wang [68] proposed an approach for safeguarding a consumer's pri-
vacy while allowing data mining and usage of data provided to an organization.
The proposed CPBAC model satises the customer privacy requirement and al-
lows users to use some data for certain purposes with conditions, thus extracting
more information from data providers. The model is exploited by using query
modication techniques to support access control based on purpose information.
One of the main challenges is to implement the model with query modication
techniques as individuals' privacy levels are ternary, not binary. On the other
hand, the authors overlooked to implement the CPBAC model in RBAC. As
RBAC is the most popular approach in access control models and is now used in
many database management systems, it is essential to execute the CPBAC model
in RBAC. By contrast, in this chapter we developed an RPAC model, where the
CPBAC model is thoroughly investigated with roles.
3.3 A conditional Role-involved CPBAC (CPAC)
In Section 3.2, we developed a RPAC model where users are required to explicitly
state their access purposes when they try to access data. Although this method
is simple and easy to implement, it requires complete trust about the identity
of users and thus the overall privacy that the system is able to provide entirely
relies on the users' trust worthiness. To overcome this problem, this section
presents a conditional role-involved purpose-based access control (CPAC) model,
where users dynamically activate conditional roles in accordance with the con-
text attributes. Based on the conditional role, access permissions are assigned
that represent what can be accessed for what purpose to roles under certain con-
ditions. On the other hand, conditional purpose is applied along with allowed
purpose and prohibited purpose in the model. Access purpose is veried in a
dynamic behavior, based on user attributes, context attributes and authorization
policies. Intended purposes are dynamically associated with the requested data
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Figure 3.5: CPAC Model
object during the access decision. Access purpose authorization and authentica-
tion in the model are studied with the hierarchical purpose structure. The model
separates authorization of access purpose from access decision, which improves
the exibility of private data control.
3.3.1 CPAC model
Based on RBAC, the CPAC model extends mainly in the following aspects.
 As in RPAC, the access permission is no longer a 2-tuple hObject; Operationi,
but a 3-tuple hObject; Operation;AccessPurposei which is called the access
purpose permission.
 Rather than static roles, the access purpose permission is assigned to Con-
ditional Roles (CR). Users dynamically activate conditional roles in accor-
dance with the context attributes during the access purpose and after the
purpose compliance process, only the users which are purpose compliant or
conditionally compliant can be returned to the users.
In the CPAC model, the privacy preserving access purpose is not explicitly as-
sociated with users but given to conditional roles by access purpose permissions.
The activation of conditional roles is dynamically executed based on users' at-
tributes and the state of the system. In this model, the NEW entity Condition
is a predicated logic expression that role attributes and system attributes must
satisfy. The CPAC model is illustrated in Figure 3.5, where the dotted lines
represent dynamic associations. The formalized denition of the CPAC model is
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shown as follows:
Denition 3.3.1 (CPAC model):
 User, Role, Operation, Object, Purpose, Condition represent the set of
users, roles, operations, objects, purposes and conditions.
 IP=fhaip; cip; pipijaip  !; cip  !; pip  !g is the set of object's in
intended purposes, where aip signies the object's permitted intended pur-
pose, cip is the conditionally permitted intended purpose and pip represents
the object's forbidden intended purposes [68].
 CR=frjr 2 Role; c 2 Cg is the set of roles with condition expression.
 APP=fho; opt; apijo 2 Object; opt 2 Operation; ap 2 Purposeg is the set
of access purpose permissions.
 IPL=fho; ipijo 2 Object; ip 2 IPg represents the set of data objects and
their predened intended purpose.
 RH  RoleRole is a partial order on roles, called the inheritance relation-
ship among roles. We also dene a partial order  which is the transitive
closure of RH. For example, r1  r2 means r1 inherits all permissions of r2.
Figure 3.3 is an example of role hierarchies of a Marketing department for
a hypothetical company.
 PT  Purpose  Purpose is a partial order on purposes (generalization/
specialization) shown in the purpose tree. Figure 2.1 is an example of
purpose tree.
 User Assignment UA  User  Role is a many-to-many mapping relation
between users and their assigned roles.
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 Condition Role Assignment CRA  UserCR is a many-to-many mapping
relation between users and their conditional roles.
 Access Purpose Permission Assignment APPA  CR  APP is a many-
to-many mapping relation between conditional roles and access purpose
permissions. It signies the action that a certain role performs on a certain
object for a certain access purpose.
 Purpose Compliance PC  APP ./ IPL is a one-to-one relation between
each access purpose permission and data object as well as its predened
intended purposes.
Now we are at the stage to provide function denitions to facilitate the dis-
cussion of the CPAC model.
 assigned role : User ! 2Role, the mapping of a user u onto a set of roles.
Formally,
assigned role(u) = fr 2 Rolejhu; ri 2 UAg
 active condition roles : User ! 2CR, the mapping of a User s onto a set
of condition roles.
 assigned access purpose permission : CR ! 2APP , the mapping of a
condition role cr onto access purpose permissions. Formally,
assigned access purpose permission(cr) = fapp 2 APP jhapp; cri 2 APPAg.
 Purpose binding : Object ! IP , the mapping of a data object o onto
intended purposes ip, which means nding the bounded intended purposes
of the object.
 Purpose compliance : AP  IP ! fTrue; ConditionallyTrue; Falseg,
is used to determine the compliance between the access purpose and the
object's intended purposes [68]. Formally,
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Purpose compliance(ap; ip)=True if ap 2 IP ?,
Purpose compliance(ap; ip)=Conditionally True if ap 2 IP ?c .
The determination of the access purpose is based on the enabling conditional
roles dynamically and the association between access purpose and roles.
3.3.2 Authorization and Authentication
In a typical privacy policy it is determined who can access what under what
conditions and for what purpose. As the existing role denitions are predened
for the access permission assignments, they may not adequately specify the set of
users to whom we wish to grant an access purpose. The idea of conditional role
is introduced which is based on the notion of role attribute and system attribute.
On the basis of conditional role, access permissions are assigned that represent
what can be accessed for what purpose to roles under certain conditions. Thus,
users dynamically activate conditional roles according to their context attributes
during the access process.
Denition 3.3.2 (Role Attributes): Role attributes are dened as the set of
role properties linked to the grant of access purpose. Let RoleAttribute denote
the set of role attributes. Every role r 2 Role is associated with a set of role
attributes, denoted by r.Attributes=fr.attr1, r.attr2, ..., r.attrng. Each attribute
r.attri is associated with a nite domain of possible values, denoted as Di. Let
RoleAttributevalue denote the set of all possible role attribute values.
Denition 3.3.3 (System Attributes): System attributes are dened as the set
of properties linked to the context of the access control system. The set of sys-
tem attributes is denoted by SystemAttribute=fsysattr1, sysattr2, ..., sysattrng.
The conditions of the access control system are specied by the values of the
system attributes. Let SystemAttributevalue denote the set of all possible system
attribute values.
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Access purpose permission is directly assigned to conditional roles not in static
roles. Thus the action of enabling conditional roles plays a signicant part in the
whole process of access purpose authorization. Again enabling a conditional role
needs dynamic condition evaluation based on user attributes and system context,
which is the dierence between role activation in RBAC and conditional role
activation in our model.
Denition 3.3.4 (Conditional Roles): A conditional role is a 2-tuple, denoted
by CR = hr; Ci, where r 2 R represents the predened static role (similar to
the role attribute in RBAC) and c 2 C represents the conditions that the values
of role attributes and system attributes must satisfy in the season. Note that
C can be constructed from primitive constraints using ^ (AND), _ (OR), and
: (NOT). Let X = RoleAttribute [ SystemAttribute, each x 2 X has a nite
domain of possible values, denoted as Domain(x). Each predicate in C dened
over X is of the form opr = (x act value), where x 2 X; value 2 Domain(x) and
act 2 f=; 6=; <;>;;g.
The condition C over X can be dened recursively as follows:
 Each predicate opr can be a condition statement with the form (x act value)
which is called an automatic condition;
 If opri and oprj are conditions then opri ^ oprj is a condition, but opri _ oprj
consists of two separate conditions.
In the CPAC model, the relations between users and static roles are predened
by security administrators and access purpose permission is assigned to condi-
tional roles, not to the static roles. Thus when a request arrives from a user,
enabling conditional roles involve the following steps:
 Finding static roles for the user
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Table 3.6: Conditional roles algorithm
Input: user is the one who requests an access
system is current system attributes
Output: conditional role set enable CR activated by user
1. Let set enable CR be a empty set of conditional roles
2. user.Attribute  the attributes of user
3. Role  assigned roles(user)
4. for each role 2 Role
5. initial role.Attribute with user.Attribute
6. for each cr 2 CR when cr = hc; ri
7. if role = r
8. if check condition(c; role; system) = True
9. then enable CR = enable CR
Sfcrg
10. return enable CR
 Finding all the conditional roles for the user. If in any season, the value of
attribute r in the conditional role hc; ri equals static roles of the user, hc; ri
is a conditional role.
 Recurring conditional roles that meet the condition evaluation during the
season.
The complete algorithm for enabling conditional roles is shown in Table 3.6. Eval-
uating the conditions based on user attributes and system attributes is an impor-
tant step in enabling condition roles. Here the function check condition(c; role;
system) returns true, if the condition logical expression is a tautology when each
variable in condition express c is substituted with the values of corresponding
attributes. We say that a user u with the static role role can activate a condition
role cri in a system if the following conditions are satised:
 role = cri[r];
 check condition(c; role; system) = True
As mentioned before, access purpose permissions are assigned to conditional
roles, not to individual users. In the CPAC model, the relations between users
and static roles are predened by security administrators and it is assumed that
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roles are already enabled when a request arrives. After roles are enabled, access
purpose authorization can be simply implemented by authorizing access purpose
permissions to certain roles based on the Access Purpose Permission Assignment
(APPA). APPA consists of predened relations between Conditional Roles and
Access Purpose Permissions in the policies determined by database administra-
tors. Therefore, after a user enables a conditional role cr, he/she gets the access
purpose permissions which are assigned to cr. Now we formally dene access
purpose authorization and its authentication.
Denition 3.3.5 (Access Purpose Authorization) Let 
 be a purpose tree and
! be the set of purposes in 
. Also let R be the set of roles dened in a system.
An access purpose is authorized to a specic set of users by a pair hap; cri, where
ap is a access purpose in ! and cr is a conditional role dened over X.
All users authorized for a conditional role cri are also authorized for any
role crj where cri  crj. Thus, activating a conditional role cri automatically
activates all conditional roles crj, such that cri  crj. Similarly, authorizing
an access purpose ap for a conditional role cri implies that the users belonging
to cri (or the users belonging to crj, where cri  crj) are authorized to access
data with ap as well as all the descendants of ap in the purpose tree. The
access purpose authentication denition below connes the implications of access
purpose authorizations.
Denition 3.3.6 (Access Purpose Authentication): Let 
 be a purpose tree, !
be the set of purposes in 
 and R be the set of roles dened in a system. Suppose
that an access purpose is ap and a role ri is activated by a user u. We say that
ap is legitimate for u under ri if there exists an access purpose authorization
hapl; crii, where apl in ! and cri = hCi; rii is a conditional role dened over X
such that ap 2 Descendants (apl) and the users belong to conditional role cri (or
any descendants of the conditional role of cri.)
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Consider the purpose tree in Figure 2.1 and the role hierarchies of a Market-
ing department for a hypothetical company in Figure 3.3. Suppose that access
purpose \Service-Updates" are assigned to the hE   Marketing; (Explevel >
10) ^ (timeofday  9) ^ (timeofday  17)i, assuming Explevel is dened as
a role attribute and timeofday is dened as a system attribute. Then only the
users who activate the role \E-Marketing" (or the two descendants role) with their
Explevel > 10 can access data for the purpose of \Service-Updates" between 9
am and 5 pm.
Through conditional roles, access purpose authorization and authentication,
users get access purpose permission from the access control engine.
Suppose that Russell is an employee working about 12 years in the Marketing
department of a company. Assume that the company is using the RBAC model
for a privacy preserving access control model and in the normal oce hours
(9 am to 5 pm), then only the users who have more than 10 years of working
experience can access customer  info for Marketing purpose. That means, in
the oce hours access purposeMarketing is authorized to users who are working
in the Marketing department and have 10 years of experience. When Russell
activates a role in the oce hours, on the basis of his role attribute and the context
of the system, he will get permission from the access control engine to access
customer  info forMarketing purpose. In other words, when Russell activates
his role, the system reasonably infer that Russell is trying to use customer  info
for Marketing purpose. Thus after activating his role, Russell gets access
purpose permission for accessing customer  info for Marketing purpose.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter we injected CPBAC with the RBAC. In the rst part of this
chapter, we presented a RPAC model where users explicitly state their access
purpose and in the second part we presented a CPAC where access purpose is
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dynamically associated with roles. These models enable enterprises to operate
as reliable keeper of their customers data. We analyzed algorithms to achieve
the compliance check between access purpose and intended purposes. The eect
of the proposed access controls can be useful for internal access control within
an organization as well as information sharing between organizations, as many
systems are already using RBAC mechanisms for the management of access per-
mission. These techniques can also be used by enterprises to enforce the privacy
promises they make and to enable their customers to maintain control over their
data.
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Part II
Data Anonymization
Chapter 4
Systematic Clustering for
k-Anonymization
Privacy preservation of individuals has drawn considerable interest in data mining
research. The k-anonymity model proposed by Samarati and Sweeney is a prac-
tical approach for data privacy preservation and has been studied extensively for
the last few years. Anonymization methods via generalization or suppression are
able to protect private information, but lose valued information. The challenge
is how to minimize the information loss during the anonymization process. This
chapter presents a clustering1 based k-anonymization technique to minimize the
information loss while at the same time assuring data quality. We refer to the
challenge as a systematic clustering problem for k- anonymization which is ana-
lyzed in this chapter. The proposed technique adopts group similar data together
and then anonymizes each group individually.
4.1 Introduction
In recent years, the phenomenal advances in technological developments in infor-
mation technology have lead to an increase in the capability to store and record
personal data about customers and individuals [32]. Data mining is a common
methodology to retrieve and discover useful hidden knowledge and information
1Clustering partitions record into clusters such that records within a cluster are similar to
each other, while records in dierent clusters are most distinct from one another.
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from personal data. This has lead to concerns that personal data may be breached
and misused. Therefore it is necessary to protect personal data through some
privacy preserving techniques before conducting data mining. Thus privacy pre-
serving is an important issue and has captured the attention of many researchers
in the data mining research community.
One of the most important concepts for privacy is anonymity. Anonymity
refers to a state where one's identity is completely hidden, and anonymity is
oftentimes used as a synonym for privacy [34]. Anonymous data can protect
individuals in two ways: rstly to protect identity privacy, for example by making
it impossible to learn to whom a data record is related and secondly, through
attribute privacy for example making it impossible to know about a particular
property of individuals. In any database, specially where health records are
collected by hospitals or government organizations, anonymity has a signicant
role to protect privacy as the information linked to individuals could be highly
sensitive. In commercial databases where organizations would like to disclose an
individual's data to third parties (e.g. external organizations), anonymity could
be used to protect the privacy of individuals as in such cases an individual's
privacy may not be respected. Thus, within organization individuals' data should
be restricted in terms of access and anonymous, by removing all information that
can directly link data items to individuals via generalization or suppression before
disclosing, so that privacy is not beached. Such a process is referred to as data
anonymization.
A contemporary approach dealing with data privacy relies on k-anonymity.
The k-anonymity model proposed by Samarati and Sweeney [17, 18] is a sim-
ple and practical privacy-preserving approach to protect data from individual
identication. The k-anonymity model works by ensuring that each record of a
table is identical to at least (k  1) other records with respect to a set of privacy-
related features, called quasi-identiers, that could be potentially used to identify
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Table 4.1: Patients records in a hospital
ZipCode Gender Age Education Disease Expense
4350 Male 24 9th Flue 2000
4351 Male 25 10th Cancer 3500
4352 Male 26 9th HIV+ 6500
4350 Male 35 9th Diabetes 2000
4350 Female 40 10th Diabetes 3200
4350 Female 38 11th Diabetes 2800
Table 4.2: 3-Anonymization table
ZipCode Gender Age Education Disease Expense
435? Person [21-30] Educated Flue 2000
435? Person [21-30] Educated Cancer 3500
435? Person [21-30] Educated HIV+ 6500
435? Person [31-40] Educated Diabetes 2000
435? Person [31-40] Educated Diabetes 3200
435? Person [31-40] Educated Diabetes 2800
individuals by linking these attributes to external data sets [37]. Therefore, pri-
vacy related information can not be revealed from the k-anonymity protected
table during a data mining process. For example, consider the patient diagnosis
records in a hospital in Table 4.1, where the attributes ZipCode, Gender, Age
and Education are regarded as quasi-identiers. A diagnosis classier can pre-
dict the patient's illness history based on attributes of ZipCode, Gender, Age
and Education using these data. If the hospital simply publishes the table to
other organizations for classier development, those organizations might extract
patients' disease histories by joining this table with other tables [36]. By con-
trast, Table 4.2 is a 3-anonymization version where data values of Table 4.1 in
attributes ZipCode, Gender, Age and Education have been generalized as com-
mon values and the number of records in its two equivalence classes are both
equal to three. It should be noted that the value of k in the k-anonymity model
is specied by users according to the purpose of their applications. By enforcing
the k-anonymity requirement, it is guaranteed that even though an adversary
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knows that a k-anonymous table contains the record of a particular individual
and also knows some of the quasi-identier attribute values of the individual,
he/she cannot determine which record in the table corresponds to the individual
with a probability greater than 1
k
[34]. This indicates that the larger the values
of k, the less chance the adversary has of being able to determine personal iden-
tiable information and the data is more protected. On the other hand, if the
k-values are too large it incurs more information loss. Therefore, the k-value of
the k-anonymization problem should not be too small or too large.
Usually, there are two methods to accomplish in k-anonymizing a dataset. The
rst one is suppression which involves not releasing an entire tuple or a value at all
to the third party, which is just like deleting them. The other one is generalization
which involves replacing the value or tuple with a less specic but semantically
consistent value. For example, suppose the following ve ages of individuals 51,
52, 53, 53, 55 exist. We can generalize attribute Age to age groups 50-55. On
the other hand, we can also generalize them to in other set 5?. However, we can
suppress the age values by ?. Intuitively, generalization is better than suppression
because of extracting at least some information. Undoubtedly, anonymization is
accompanied by information loss. In order to be useful in practice, the dataset
should stay as much informative as possible. Hence, it is necessary to consider
deeply the tradeo between privacy and information loss. To minimize the in-
formation loss due to k- anonymization, all records are partitioned into several
groups such that each group contains at least k similar records with respect to the
quasi-identiers. Then the records in each group are generalized or suppressed
such that the values of each quasi-identier are the same. Such similar groups are
known as clusters. In the context of data mining, clustering is a useful technique
that partitions records into clusters such that records within a cluster are similar
to each other, while records in dierent clusters are most distinct from one an-
other [37]. Thus, the k-anonymity model can be addressed from the viewpoint of
CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMATIC CLUSTERING FOR K-ANONYMIZATION 66
clustering.
As discussed, a key diculty of data anonymization comes from the fact that
data quality and privacy are conicting goals. Although it is possible to enhance
data privacy by hiding more data values, it decreases data quality. By contrast,
disclosing more data values increases data quality but decreases data privacy.
Thus it is necessary to devise new k-anonymization approaches that best address
both the quality and the privacy of the data. To overcome this challenge, this
chapter proposes a new clustering method for k-anonymization. This method has
a time complexity of O(n
2
k
) in the clustering stage, where n is the total number of
records that containing individuals concerning their privacy. However, the algo-
rithm requires sorting the tuples in the dataset once, which alone takes O(nlogn)
time. According to this method, rst exclude the number of records containing
individuals who do not bother about the disclosure of personal identication in-
formation. Sort all records by their quasi-identiers and partition all records into
[n
k
] groups. Randomly select a record r from the rst group to form the rst clus-
ter and the rst records of the subsequent clusters will form in a systematic way.
Then adjust the records in each group in a systematic way such that each group
contains at least k records. Finally, distribute the records of individuals who do
not bother about the disclosure to their closest clusters or these records consti-
tute another cluster/clusters depending on the number of such records and the k-
value. Note that the process of including such records causes no information loss.
There are many clustering based k-anonymization techniques in the literature
[34, 35, 36, 37, 45]. However, the proposed systematic clustering method diers
from previously proposed clustering based k-anonymization methods in four dif-
ferent ways. First, our method endeavours to make all clusters simultaneously.
By contrast, the methods proposed by Byun et al. [34] and Loukides and Shao
[35] build one cluster at a time. Second, it takes less time than the previous two
methods as only the rst record randomly selects and the subsequently records
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form in a systematic way. Third, since the rst record of each cluster contains
a non identical value, this method easily captures if there are any extreme val-
ues, and lastly the total information loss will be reduced as in the nal step the
process incurs no information loss. The performance of the proposed method is
compared against the method proposed by Byun et al. [34]. The experimental
results show that the proposed clustering method outperforms their method with
respect to both information loss and computational eciency.
4.2 Preliminaries Relating to k- Anonymization
The k-anonymity model has drawn considerable interest in the research com-
munity for the last few years and a number of algorithms have been proposed
[26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 42, 43]. However, these suer from high information loss
mainly due to reliance on pre-dened generalization hierarchies [27, 28, 29, 31]
or total order [26, 30] imposed on each attribute domain. Some existing work on
k-anonymization has attempted to capture usefulness by measuring the number
of total suppressions [38], the size of the anonymized group [27, 30], the height of
generalisation hierarchies [17, 34], or information loss through anonymization [39].
However, such metrics fail to detain security. In other works by Machanavajjhala
et al. [40], and Truta and Vinay [40, 41] attempts have been made to enhance
protection by enforcing anonymized groups. The intuition behind this is that
if the values of a sensitive attribute of an anonymized group are quite diverse,
then it is dicult for an attacker to breach privacy. However, these frequency-
based criteria treat numerical attributes as categorical and thus protection is
not captured adequately. For instance, l-diversity proposed by Machanavajjhala
et al. [40] requires a sensitive attribute to have at least l distinct values in an
anonymized group. Please refer to Ciriani et al. [26] for a survey of various k
anonymization approaches.
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4.2.1 Information Loss
Anonymization via generalization or suppression usually causes information loss.
Now a natural question arises of how much information is lost due to anonymiza-
tion. Thus the idea of information loss is used to measure the amount of in-
formation loss due to k-anonymization. There are various methods of conniving
information loss [14, 27, 34, 37, 105]. The measurement of information loss in
this article is based on the description given by Byun et al. [34]. Please also refer
to Byun et al. [34] for more details.
Let  denote a set of records with r numeric quasi-identiers N1; N2; :::; Nr
and s categorical quasi-identiers C1; C2; :::; Cs. Let = = f
1;
2; :::;
pg be a
partitioning of , such that [pi=1
i = , 
i and 
j (i 6= j) are pair wise mutually
exclusive. To generalize the values of each categorical attribute Ci(i = 1; 2; :::; s),
let Ci be the taxonomy tree dened for the domain of Ci.
435*
4350 4351 4352
Figure 4.1: Taxonomy tree of ZipCode.
Consider a cluster 
 in  which consists of some numerical and categorical
attributes. Let Nimax , Nimin be the maximum and minimum values of the records
in 
 and Nimax ; Nimin be the maximum and minimum values of the records in 
with respect to numeric attribute Ni(i = 1; 2; :::; r) and [Ci be the union set of
values in 
 with respect to the categorical attribute Ci(i = 1; 2; :::; s). Then the
amount of information loss due to generalizing 
, denoted by IL(
) is dened as
IL(
) =j 
 j :(
rX
i=1
Nimax  Nimin
Nimax   Nimin
+
sX
j=1
H(([Cj))
H(Cj)
)
where j 
 j is the number of records in 
, ([Cj) is the subtree rooted at the
lowest common ancestor of every value in [Cj and H() is the height of taxonomy
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tree  .
Suppose that the total number of records in  is partitioned into p clusters,
namely = = f
1;
2; :::;
pg. The total information loss of  is the sum of the
information loss of each 
i(i = 1; 2; :::; p). Therefore, the total information loss
will be:
IL() =
pX
i=1
IL(
i)
=
pX
i=1
j 
i j :(
rX
k=1
Nikmax  Nikmin
Nikmax   Nikmin
+
sX
j=1
H(([Cij))
H(Cij)
) (4.1)
Secondary
Education
9th 10th 11th 12th
Primary
Figure 4.2: Taxonomy tree of Education.
Male Female
Gender
Figure 4.3: Taxonomy tree of Gender.
The main objective of clustering techniques is to construct the clusters in such
a way that the total information loss of  will be minimum.
Example 4.2.1 Consider patient records in Table 4.1 and the 3-anonymization
table in Table 4.2. The anonymized table consists of two clusters. The rst cluster
consists of the rst three records and the second clusters consists of the last three
records. Consider attributes ZipCode, Gender, Age, Education, where Age is a
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quantitative variable and the others are categorical variables. Also consider the
taxonomy tree of ZipCode, Education and Gender in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2 and
Figure 4.3 respectively. In the table the number of clusters is 2 and the size
of each cluster is 3. In the rst cluster the maximum and minimum values are
respectively 26 and 24, and in the second cluster these values are respectively 40
and 35. Also the maximum and minimum values of all records are respectively
40 and 24. Then the total information Loss of the anonymized table in Table 4.2
will be
IL() =j 3 j (26  24
40  24 + 1 + 1 +
1
2
)+ j 3 j (40  35
40  24 + 1 + 1 +
2
2
)  14:81: (4.2)
4.2.2 Clustering based techniques
Clustering based techniques are now used in k-anonymization to protect the pri-
vacy of sensitive attributes and there are various clustering techniques in the
literature [30, 34, 35, 36, 37]. Byun et al. [34] introduced clustering techniques in-
stead of equivalence class on k anonymization and proposed the greedy k-member
clustering algorithm. This algorithm works by rst randomly selecting a record
r as the seed to start building a cluster, and subsequently selecting and adding
more records to the cluster such that the added records incur the least informa-
tion loss within the cluster. Once the number of records in this cluster reaches k,
this algorithm selects a new record that is the furthest from r, and repeats the
same process to build the next cluster. When there are fewer than k records not
assigned to any cluster yet, this algorithm then individually assigns these records
to their closest clusters. This algorithm has two drawbacks. First, it is slow.
Second, it is sensitive to outliers. To build a new cluster, this algorithm chooses
a new record that is the furthest from the rst record selected for the previous
cluster. If the data contains outliers, it is likely that outliers have a great chance
of being selected. If a cluster contains outliers, the information loss of this cluster
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increases. The time complexity of the algorithm is O(n2), where n is the number
of records in the data set to be anonymized. Their experimental results showed
that the k-member algorithm causes signicantly less information loss than an-
other k-anonymization technique called \Mondrian" proposed by LeFevre et al.
[30].
Loukides and Shao [35] proposed another clustering technique for k- anonymiza-
tion. Similar to k-member, this algorithm forms one cluster at a time. But, unlike
the k-member algorithm, this algorithm chooses the seed of each cluster randomly.
Also, when building a cluster, this algorithm keeps selecting and adding records
to the cluster until the information loss exceeds a user dened threshold. If
the number of records of a particular class is less than k, the entire cluster is
deleted. With the help of the user-dened threshold, this algorithm is less sensi-
tive to outliers. The time complexity of the algorithm is O(n
2log(n)
c
), where c is
the average number of records in each cluster. However, this algorithm also has
two drawbacks. First, it is dicult to decide a proper value for the user-deed
threshold. Second, this algorithm might delete many records, which in turn cause
a signicant information loss. Chiu and Tsai [36] proposed another algorithm for
k-anonymization that adapts the weighted feature c-means clustering. Unlike the
previous two algorithms, this algorithm attempts to build all clusters simulta-
neously by rst randomly selecting bn
k
c records as seeds. Then this algorithm
allocates all records in the data set to their respective closest cluster and con-
sequently updates feature weights to minimize information loss. This process is
continued until the assignment of records to cluster stops changing. If some clus-
ters contain fewer than k records, then those clusters should be merged with other
large clusters to satisfy the k-anonymity requirement. One of the main drawback
of this algorithm is that it can only be used for quantitative quasi-identier. The
time complexity of this algorithm is O( t
2
k
), where t is the number of iterations
needed for the assignment of records to clusters to converge.
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To reduce the information loss and execution time, recently Lin and Wei [37]
proposed an ecient one-pass k-mean clustering problem that runs in O(n
2
k
).
They showed that their algorithm performs better than the proposed algorithm
of Byun et al. [34] with respect to both execution time and information loss.
Like Chiu and Tsai's [36] algorithm, this algorithm forms all clusters at a time.
According to their methods, rst sort all records by their quasi-identiers, then
determine approximate number of clusters, by p = n
k
, where k is the cluster size.
Then randomly select p records as seeds to build p clusters. For each record r
the algorithm nds the cluster that is closest to r, assigns r to that cluster and
subsequently updates the center point. Finally, if some clusters contain more
than k records remove excess records from those clusters that are dissimilar to
most of the records and then add these records to other similar clusters (whose
size less is than k). Although this method has less execution time there is still a
chance of being aected by extreme values. Again if this algorithm rst selects p
records that come from the same equivalent class then the total information loss
will be higher.
4.3 The New Systematic Clustering Method
As discussed before, clustering escorts to better data quality of the disclosed
dataset as it partitions a set of records into groups such that records in the same
group are more similar to each other than to records of other groups. If the
records in a particular group are more similar, the group leads to a minimal
generalization and thus incurs less information loss. In this respect, the problem
of k-anonymization can also be considered as a clustering problem, where each
equivalent class is a cluster and the size of each cluster is at least k. So the optimal
solution of a clustering problem is to construct a set of clusters such that the total
information loss will be at a minimum. In this section, we formally dene and
present our systematic clustering algorithm that minimizes information loss and
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respects the k-anonymity requirement.
4.3.1 Systematic clustering problem
There are various clustering problems in the literature. Among them, the k-center
clustering problem proposed by Gonzalez [45] aims to nd k clusters from a given
dataset such that the maximum inter-cluster distance (or radius) is minimized.
Thus the optimum solution is to constitute p clusters f
1;
2; :::;
pg in such a
way that it minimizes the cost metric
MAXi=1;:::;pMAXj;k=1;:::;j
ijD(ri;j; ri;k); (4.3)
where ri;j represents a data point in cluster 
i and D(x; y) is a distance between
two data points, x and y.
In the k-anonymity problem the only restriction is that the number of records
in each equivalence class should be at least k and there is no such restriction about
the number of clusters. So a clustering problem is to form in such a way that each
cluster contains at least k similar records and the sum of information losses of all
clusters is at a minimum. The proposed k member clustering problem of Byun
et al.[34] satises this criterion but one of the most important problems of this
algorithm is that it spends a lot of time selecting records from the input set. To
reduce time of selecting records from the whole set, a systematic method of select-
ing records may be helpful. To apply a systematic method of selecting records,
rst of all it is necessary to sort all records in the whole data set with respect to
quasi-identiers. For example, consider the dataset in Table 4.1, where there are
6 records and suppose that the dataset is already sorted according to the quasi
identier attributes ZipCode, Gender, Age and Education. If the anonymized
table follows 3-anonymity requirements, then the number of clusters should be
6
3
= 2. First select a record (say, the 2th record) from the rst 3 records to form
the rst cluster. Then select (2 + 3)th = 5th record in a systematic way to form
the second cluster. Now again select another record from the rst 3 records (say,
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3rd, not 2th, as it already selected) and calculate the information loss with both
clusters using the equation (4.1). The information loss is 4.25 and 7.75, if this
record is included in the rst cluster and second cluster respectively. So, the 3rd
record will be included in the rst cluster as it causes the least information loss.
Similarly, select (3 + 3)th = 6th record in a systematic way and include it in
the the second cluster. Finally select the 1st and (1 + 3)th = 4th record and in-
clude these records respectively as rst and second cluster as they will then cause
least information loss. If the total number of records are not exactly divisible
by the k-anonymity parameter, then the rest of the records will be included in
the similar clusters where information loss is minimum and this process continues
until the number of records in a particular cluster is k to satisfy the k-anonymity
requirement. Thus we pretend k-anonymity problem to be a clustering problem,
referred to as a systematic clustering problem.
Denition 4.3.1 (Systematic clustering problem) The systematic clustering prob-
lem is to nd a set of clusters from a given set of n records such that each cluster
contains at least k (k  n) records (where the records are selected in a systematic
way and are included in a cluster that causes the least information loss) and that
the sum of all intra-cluster distances is minimized. More specically, if  be a set
of n records and k the specied anonymization parameter, the optimal solution
of the systematic clustering problem is a set of clusters = = f
1;
2; :::;
pg such
that:
1. 
i \ 
j = , for all i 6= j = 1; 2; :::; p,
2. [pi=1;:::;p = ,
3. for all 
i 2 =; j 
i j k, and
4. the total information loss obtained by using equation (4.1) is minimized.
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In Denition 4.3.1, a set of clusters are constructed in such a way that the
clusters are mutually exclusive, the sum of records of all clusters is equal to the
total number of records and the size of each cluster is at least k which satises
the criteria of k-anonymization. The problem tries to minimize the sum of all
intra-cluster distances, where an intra-cluster distance of a cluster is dened as
the maximum distance between any two records in the cluster. In the following
subsection we formally design a systematic clustering algorithm.
Table 4.3: Systematic clustering algorithm
Input: a set  of n records containing individuals concerning their
privacy, where 1; 2; :::; n 2 ; the value k for k-anonymity
Output: a partitioning = = f
1;
2; :::;
pg of 
1. Sort all records in  by their quasi-identiers;
2. Let p:= intbnk c;
3. Get randomly k distinct records r1; r2; :::; rk from rst 1 to k;
4. Let pij is the jth element in the ith cluster;
5. For i = 1 to p;
6. Let pi1 := [r1+k(i 1)];
7. Next i;
8. For j := 2 to k;
9. For i := 1 to p;
10. Let ILi: = InfoLoss([rj+k(i 1)]);
11. Let X:= Find cluster number with lowest ILi;
12. where cluster size  k;
13. Add [rj+p(i 1)] to px;
14. Next i;
15. Next j;
16. Let e := (n  pk);
17. Find extra element E1; E2; :::; Ee 2 E;
18. For k := 1 to e;
19. For m := 1 to p;
20. Let ILm := InfoLoss(Ek) in cluster m;
21. Next m;
22. Let X := Find cluster number with lowest IL;
23. Add Ek to px;
24. Next k;
4.3.2 Systematic clustering algorithm
Based on the information loss in equation (4.1) and the denition of a systematic
clustering problem, we are now ready to discuss a systematic clustering algorithm.
The general idea of the algorithm is as follows.
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Note that for collecting medical data from patients it may be expected that
some patients are not concerned about the privacy of their medical records and the
other attributes. We would like to explore this opportunity because unnecessary
anonimization may produce more information loss. Let q be the probability that a
particular patient is not concerned about the privacy of medical records. Then out
of n patients we can expect that on average nq patients are not concerned about
their privacy. According to this method, rst exclude the records of individuals
who are not concerned about their privacy. Then sort all records by their quasi-
identiers and identify the equivalence class and the number of clusters by, p =
(n nq)
k
, where k is the anonymity parameter for k-anonymization and round this
as integer. Randomly select a record ri from rst k records as seeds to form
the rst cluster. If there are p clusters to be formed then select the (ri + k)th,
(ri+2k)th,..., fri+(p 1)kgth records in a systematic way to form the 2nd, 3rd,
..., pth cluster respectively. Select another record rj(j 6= i) from the rst k records
and add this record to the cluster which causes least information loss. Similarly, in
a systematic way select (rj+k)th, (rj+2k)th,..., frj+(p 1)kgth records and add
these records to their respective clusters that cause least information loss. If any
cluster size is exactly k, stop adding records to that cluster and continue the same
process until all records of rst k records are nished. If (n  nq) is not exactly
divisible by k and there are still some records left, add these records to their
closest clusters that incur least information loss. Finally distribute the nq records
to their closest clusters or these nq records constitute separate cluster/clusters
depending on their size. Note that these nq records incur no information loss.
Since only the rst record randomly selects and the subsequent records from in
a systematic way, it has less execution time. Again usually the rst record of
each cluster contains a non identical value, so this algorithm easily captures if
there are any extreme values. Moreover, this algorithm is adding some records
that contain no information loss, so it is a natural expectation that the total
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information loss will be reduced. The systematic clustering algorithm is shown
in Table 4.3. In the algorithm it is assumed that all n individuals are concerned
about their privacy.
Denition 4.3.2 (Systematic clustering decision problem) In a given data set
of n records, there is a clustering scheme = = f
1;
2; :::;
pg such that
1. j 
i j k; 1 < k  n: the size of each cluster is greater than or equal to a
positive integer k, and
2.
Pp
i=1 IL(
i) < c; c > 0: the total information loss of the clustering scheme
is less than a positive integer c.
where each cluster 
i(i = 1; 2; :::; p) contains the records that are more similar
to each other, such that they require minimum generalization and thus cause
least information loss. In the following subsection we are going to discuss some
properties of the proposed systematic clustering algorithm.
4.3.3 Properties of the proposed algorithm
As discussed before, the proposed algorithm is designed in such a way that it
nds a solution of k-anonymization in a greedy manner. This algorithm stops
adding records in a particular cluster if the cluster size is exactly k. Again it
always keeps in mind to add records that incur less information loss. Moreover,
the records are selected in a systematic way that make the algorithm faster. With
respect to this, this algorithm has the following desirable properties.
Theorem 4.3.1 Let n be the total number of input records and k be the spec-
ied k anonymity parameter. The time complexity of the systematic clustering
algorithm in the clustering stage is in O(n
2
k
).
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Proof After sorting the records with respect to the quasi-identiers, the system-
atic clustering algorithm determines the numbers of clusters by p = n
k
. Then it
selects the records as seeds in a systematic way to form all p clusters simultane-
ously. Thus for each tuple in the dataset, the algorithm needs to assign it to one
of the p clusters, which has a complexity of O(p). As a result, the assignment of
all tuples to the clusters has a time complexity of
T = O(Number of tuples Number of clusters)
= O(n  p) = O(n  n
k
) = O(
n2
k
): (4.4)
Therefore, the total execution time is in O(n
2
k
):
Theorem 4.3.2 Let n be the total number of input records and q be the proba-
bility that a particular individual does not bother about the disclosure. Then the
systematic clustering algorithm in fact work out the information loss of (n  nq)
individuals instead of all n individuals.
Proof If q be the probability that a particular individual does not bother about
the disclosure. Then out of n individuals, nq individuals are not bothered about
the disclosure. Assume that these nq records are in one separate cluster that
causes no information loss. Also let IL() and IL(all) be the total informa-
tion loss due to k-anonymization for a systematic clustering algorithm and any
other clustering algorithm respectively. According to the systematic clustering
algorithm, the total information loss will be:
IL() = IL(n)
= IL(nq) + IL(n  nq)
= 0 + IL(n  nq) = IL(n  nq): (4.5)
Thus, the systematic clustering algorithm actually calculates the information loss
of (n  nq) records instead of calculating the information loss of all n records.
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Theorem 4.3.3 Let n be the total number of input records and k be the anonym-
ity parameter in k-anonymization. Then according to the systematic clustering
algorithm, the cluster size of any cluster is at least k but no more than (2k   1).
Proof Let n be the total number of input records. According to systematic
clustering, rst select the initial seeds of all clusters in a systematic way and sub-
sequently select adding more records to the clusters such that the added records
incur the least information loss. Again this algorithm stops adding records to
a particular cluster if the number of records is exactly k. So in the worst case,
if there are (k   1) records left and if all these records are included in a cluster
that already contains k records, then the total number of records in that cluster
will be (k + k   1) = (2k   1). Therefore the maximum size of a cluster will be
(2k   1).
The properties discussed above show the utility of the proposed clustering
algorithm with respect to both information loss and execution time. However
it is necessary to check the eciency of the algorithm by doing an experiment.
In the following section the experimental results of the proposed algorithm are
discussed.
4.4 Experimental Results
The objective of our experiment is to investigate the recital of our approach in
terms of data quality and computational eciency. To accurately evaluate our
approach, the performance of the proposed systematic clustering algorithm is
compared in this section with the k-member algorithm [34]. Byun et al. [34]
showed that k-member algorithm causes signicantly less information loss than
\Mondrian", proposed by LeFevre et al. [30]. As it already evaluated that the
k-member algorithm outperforms \Mondrian", in this chapter we compare our
proposed algorithm with the k-member algorithm. Both experiments are imple-
mented with Excel VBA programming language and run on a 3.20 GHz Pentium
CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMATIC CLUSTERING FOR K-ANONYMIZATION 80
(R) D CPU processor machine with 2GB of RAM. The operating system on the
machine was Microsoft Windows XP Professional Version 2002.
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Figure 4.4: Information Loss
We utilized Adult dataset from the UC Irvine Machine Learning Repository
[44] for both the experiments. It should be noted that the Adult dataset is
considered as a standard benchmark for evaluating the performance of any k-
anonymity algorithm. We deleted the records with missing values and retained
only three of the original attributes, namely Age, Sex and Education as quasi-
identiers. Among these, Age is a numeric attribute but Sex and Education are
the categorical attributes. The taxonomy trees for these two categorical attributes
are based on Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 respectively.
The experiments are conducted as follows. First, the systematic clustering
algorithm with three dierent scenarios (q = 1%; q = 5%; q = 10%) and the
k-member algorithm are run ve times for every k value, and total information
loss and execution time are collected for each run. Then, the average of every
ve runs using the same algorithm and k is computed and reported here.
Figure 4.4 shows the information loss of both the systematic clustering algo-
rithm along with three levels (q = 1%; q = 5%; q = 10%) and the k-member
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Figure 4.5: Execution Time
algorithm [34] with respect to the k-anonymity parameter. It shows that the to-
tal information loss of each of the algorithms increases as k increases. The logic
behind this is that as k increases the clusters need to maximize generalization
and this incurs more information loss. One of the most important criteria of
choose a best clustering method is that it causes the least information loss. In
this aspect, a systematic clustering method with q = 10% uniformly satises this
criterion. That means that if at least 10% of individuals do not care about the
disclosure then the systematic clustering method is the best choice as a cluster-
ing technique for k-anonymization in the data mining environment. However,
as Figure 4.4 shows, for some moderate values of k (k  40), the systematic
clustering method always incurs less information loss even if all individuals are
concerned about their privacy. In practice, the k-value of the k-anonymization
problem should not be too small or too large as small values of k signify higher
probability of disclosure and large values of k signify the more information loss.
Thus in a realistic situation, k  40 is reasonable for k-anonymity problems and
in that case the proposed systematic clustering algorithm attains a reasonable
dominance over the k-member algorithm.
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On the other hand, Figure 4.5 displays the execution time of both algorithms.
Figure 4.5 clearly shows that the execution time of the proposed systematic clus-
tering algorithm with all dierent scenarios is much less than in the k-member
algorithm. The greedy k- member algorithm takes too much time as it spends
a lot of time selecting records from the input set. Again as expected, the exe-
cution time of the systematic clustering algorithm decreases with the increase of
the probability that a particular individual does not care about the privacy as in
this case the total number of records in the input set decreases. Thus it can be
said that the proposed method is superior to the k-member algorithm in terms
of both information loss and execution time.
As discussed before, a main challenge in data mining is to enable the legiti-
mate usage and sharing of mined information while at the same time guaranteeing
proper protection of the original sensitive data. Because of increasing concerns
about the privacy of individuals, privacy preserving is an important issue and has
captured the attention of many researchers in the data mining research commu-
nity. Although k-anonymity is a proper solution of protecting sensitive attributes
in a dataset, the main drawback of the method is the information loss. Thus, a
natural question arises in this case: how to design a method in such a way that
causes less information loss and execution time and at the same time satises
the k-anonymity requirement. Based on this, an algorithm is developed in this
chapter that uses the idea of clustering and incurs as little information loss as
possible. As Figure 4.4 and Figure 4.5 show the proposed algorithm causes less
information loss and execution time, and it demonstrates the exibility and the
usability of the proposed algorithm.
4.5 Anonymization for incremental Datasets
Anonymization based on k-anonymity models has been the focus of intensive
research in the last few years. However the current techniques related to the
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k-anonymity model are limited only where it is assumed that the entire dataset
is available at the time of release (static data). This assumption leads to a short-
coming as data nowadays are continuously collected (thus continuously growing)
and there is a strong demand for up-to-date data at all times [33]. In such a
dynamic environment the proposed systematic clustering method can be easily
applied without any modication of the previous anonymously released data.
Suppose that a hospital wants to publish its patient records for medical re-
searchers and it is assumed that the hospital has already released the entire static
data by using the systematic clustering method. The hospital can then infer the
released data and this prior information can be used when a new record will be
released. Assume that the hospital anonymized n records contain individuals
concerning their privacy and build p clusters, where the information loss and the
size of the ith cluster are respectively as fi and Ni (
Pp
i Ni = n). Thus, the
total information loss is f =
Pp
i fi and the proportion of information loss in the
ith cluster is P (f ji) = fi
n
. Moreover, the probability that a new record will be
included in the ith cluster is P (i) = Ni
n
. Thus according to the Bays approach,
the total probability of information loss is
P (f) = P (1)P (f j1) + P (2)P (f j2) +   + P (p)P (f jp) =
pX
i=1
Nifi
nf
(4.6)
..........
1 2 ........... pCluster
Info. Loss f1 f2
......... fp
Cluster size
.........
N1 N2 Np
Total probability of information loss
Figure 4.6: Bays Approach
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The Bays approach is illustrated in Figure 4.6. Now suppose that the hospital
wants to release a new record and assume that this record contains individuals'
concerning their privacy (so needs anonymization and thus produce information
loss), then the probability that this record will be included in the ith cluster is
P (ijf) =
Nifi
nfPp
i=1
Nifi
nf
=
NifiPp
i=1Nifi
(4.7)
The higher probability indicates that the information loss will be higher if the
new record is included in that particular cluster. So the new record should be
included where the posterior probability is at a minimum. However, this is a
preliminary idea of including a new record in a cluster. The easiest way to
calculate the information loss of the new record with the existing clusters is to
include the record with the cluster that causes the least information loss. As
the preconstructed clusters based on the systematic clustering algorithm satisfy
the k-anonymity requirement, the inclusion of the new record also respects the
condition without any modication of preexisting clusters. Thus without any
loss of generality the systematic clustering algorithm can be used for incremental
datasets.
4.6 Systematic clustering for l-diversity
In Section 4.3, we have developed a systematic clustering method for k- anonymiza-
tion. In this Section, we extend this approach to the l-diversity model that as-
sumes that every group of indistinguishable records contains at least l distinct
sensitive attributes values. The proposed technique adopts to group similar data
together with l-diverse sensitive values and then anonymizes each group individ-
ually.
The proposed systematic clustering method outperforms the recent clustering
based k-anonymization techniques. However the k-anonymity model may reveal
sensitive information under two attacks, namely the homogeneity attack and the
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Table 4.4: Patients records in a hospital
ZipCode Gender Age Education Disease Expense
1 4350 Male 24 9th Flue 2000
2 4351 Male 25 10th Cancer 3500
3 4352 Male 26 9th HIV+ 6500
4 4350 Male 35 9th Diabetes 2000
5 4350 Female 40 10th Diabetes 3200
6 4350 Female 38 11th Diabetes 2800
7 4352 male 41 9th Flue 2700
8 4352 Female 42 10th Heart disease 4800
9 4352 male 43 10th Cancer 5200
background knowledge attack [40]. For example, Jak and Ron are two antagonis-
tic neighbors. Jak knows that Ron has been to hospital recently and tries to nd
out the disease that Ron suers from. Jak nds the 3-anonymous table as in Table
4.5. He knows that Ron is 39 years old and lives in a suburb with postcode 4350.
Ron must be record 4, 5 or 6. All three patients are suering from diabetes. Jak
knows for sure that Ron suers from diabetes. Thus homogeneous values in the
sensitive attribute of a k-anonymous group escape private information. Similarly
k-anonymity does not protect individuals from a background knowledge attack.
To overcome this problem, Machanavajjhala et al. [40] presented an l-diversity
model to enhance the k-anonymity model. The l-diversity model assumes that
a private dataset contains some sensitive attribute(s) which cannot be modied.
Such a sensitive attribute is then considered disclosed when the association be-
tween a sensitive attribute value and a particular individual can be inferred with
a signicant probability. In order to prevent such inferences, the l-diversity model
requires that every group of indistinguishable records contains at least l distinct
sensitive attribute values; thereby the risk of attribute disclosure is kept under 1
l
.
For example, records 4, 5 and 6 in Table 4.5 form a 3-diverse group. The records
contain three values with equal frequencies of 33:33%, and no value is dominant.
If we assume that l = 2, then although Table 4.5 is 3-anonymized but it is not
a 2-diverse table as in the second equivalence class, the number of sensitive at-
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Table 4.5: 3-Anonymization table
ZipCode Gender Age Education Disease Expense
1 435? Person [21-30] Primary Flue 2000
2 435? Person [21-30] Primary Cancer 3500
3 435? Person [21-30] Primary HIV+ 6500
4 435? Person [31-40] Secondary Diabetes 2000
5 435? Person [31-40] Secondary Diabetes 3200
6 435? Person [31-40] Secondary Diabetes 2800
7 435? Person [41-50] Primary Flue 2700
8 435? Person [41-50] Primary Heart disease 4800
9 435? Person [41-50] Primary Cancer 5200
tribute value is only one (Diabetes). Thus it is necessary to devise new enhanced
k-anonymization approaches (for example l-diversity) that best address both the
quality and the privacy of the data. In Section 4.3, we developed a systematic
clustering method for k-anonymization. However, as l-diversity is a more prim-
itive and protected model than k-anonymization, it is necessary to extend the
systematic clustering algorithm in the l-diversity model. This extension of the
systematic clustering method to the l-diversity model is presented in this Section.
It has been done in two steps. In the rst step it develops some clusters that sat-
isfy the k-anonymity requirements, called the clustering step for k-anonymization
(same as described in Section 4.3). In the second step, it develops clusters that
satisfy the l-diverse requirement on the sensitive attributes, called the l-diverse
step. According to this step, rst remove clusters in the rst step that do not
satisfy the l-diversity requirement. Then add the records contained in these clus-
ters to other clusters that already satisfy the l-diversity requirement where they
cause least information loss. Note that inclusion of new records to other clusters
does not violate the l-diversity requirement. There are many clustering based
k-anonymization techniques [34, 35, 36, 37, 45] that are available but to the best
of our knowledge there is no such approach for the l-diversity model in the lit-
erature. Based on the leakages, this work is devoted to a systematic clustering
method for the l-diversity model.
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As discussed before, the problem of k-anonymization can be considered as a
clustering problem, where each equivalent class is a cluster and the size of each
cluster is at least k. However, the requirement for the l-diversity model is to
satisfy at least l distinct sensitive attribute values in each equivalent class. Thus
the optimal solution to a clustering problem is to construct a set of clusters that
satisfy both k-anonymity and l-diversity requirements and the total information
loss will be as minimal as possible. Now we formally dene and present our
systematic clustering algorithm that minimizes the information loss and respects
the k-anonymity and l-diversity requirement.
4.6.1 Systematic clustering problem for l-diversity
In the k-anonymity problem the restriction is that the number of records in each
equivalence class should be at least k and in the l-diversity model the restriction
is that the number of sensitive attribute values in each equivalence class must be
at least l distinct values, but there is no such restriction about the number of
clusters in both cases. So a clustering problem is to form in such a way that each
cluster contains at least k similar records, l distinct sensitive records and the sum
of information losses of all clusters is as small as possible. To apply a systematic
method to the l-diversity model of selecting records we need to follow two steps.
The rst one is the clustering step for k-anonymization and the second one is
the l-diverse step. Suppose that we would like to apply a systematic clustering
method to the l-diversity model for Table 4.4. Then in the clustering step for
k-annualization rst sort all records in the whole data set with respect to quasi-
identiers. There are 9 records in Table 4.4 and suppose that the dataset is
already sorted according to the quasi identier attributes ZipCode, Gender, Age
and Education. If the anonymized table follows 3-anonymity requirements, then
the number of clusters should be 9
3
= 3. Select a record (say, 2th record) from
the rst 3 records to form the rst cluster. Then select (2 + 3)th = 5th and
(2 + 2  3)th = 8th records in a systematic way to form the second and third
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cluster respectively. Now again select another record from the rst 3 records
(say, 3rd not 2th as it is already selected) and calculate the information loss
with all of the three clusters using the equation (4.1). The information losses are
respectively 5.10, 6.47 and 6.68, if this record is included in the rst, second and
third cluster. Thus, the 3rd record will be included in the rst cluster as it causes
least information loss. Similarly select (3 + 3)th = 6th and (3 + 2  3)th = 9th
record in a systematic way and include them in the second and third cluster
respectively. Finally select the 1st, (1 + 3)th = 4th and (1 + 2  3)th = 7th
record and include these records in the rst, second and third cluster respectively
as they will then cause least information loss. If the total number of records
is not exactly divisible by the k-anonymity parameter, then rest records will
be included to similar clusters where information loss is at a minimum and this
process continues until the number of records in a particular cluster is k to satisfy
the k-anonymity requirement. Thus in the clustering step for k-anonymization,
a set of clusters is built that satises the k-anonymity requirement. In the l-
diverse step, the clusters will be formed in such a way that the number of distinct
sensitive attribute values in each cluster is at least l. Note that if in the clustering
step the table already satises the l-diversity requirement, the next step is not
required. Suppose that l = 3, in this particular example, then the clusters that
are obtained in the rst step do not satisfy the l diversity requirement as the
second cluster consists of only one distinct sensitive attribute value. Therefore,
in the l-diverse step remove this cluster and the records contained in this cluster
to other similar clusters that cause the least information loss. All of the three
records in this cluster will be included in the third cluster as these records will
then incur less information loss. Thus we get a table in Table 4.6 that satises
both the 3-anonymity and 3-diversity requirements. The process of building the
table by using a systematic method protects individuals' private information as
well as sensitive attributes.
CHAPTER 4. SYSTEMATIC CLUSTERING FOR K-ANONYMIZATION 89
Table 4.6: 3-diversity table
ZipCode Gender Age Education Disease Expense
1 435? Person [21-30] Primary Flue 2000
2 435? Person [21-30] Primary Cancer 3500
3 435? Person [21-30] Primary HIV+ 6500
4 435? Person [31-50] Educated Diabetes 2000
5 435? Person [31-50] Educated Diabetes 3200
6 435? Person [31-50] Educated Diabetes 2800
7 435? Person [31-50] Educated Flue 2700
8 435? Person [31-50] Educated Heart disease 4800
9 435? Person [31-50] Educated Cancer 5200
Denition 4.6.1 (Systematic clustering problem for l-diversity) The systematic
clustering problem is to nd a set of clusters from a given set of n records such that
each cluster contains at least k (k  n) records (where the records are selected
in a systematic way and included in a cluster that causes least information loss),
the number of distinct sensitive attribute values is at least l(l  2) and that the
sum of all intra-cluster distances is as minimal as possible. More specically, if
 be a set of n records and k & l are the specied anonymization and diversity
parameter, the optimal solution of the systematic clustering problem is a set of
clusters = = f
1;
2; :::::g such that:
1. 
i \ 
j = , for all i 6= j = 1; 2; :::::,
2. [i=1;::::: = ,
3. for all 
i 2 =; j 
i j k & l  2, and
4. the total information loss obtained by using equation (4.1) is minimized.
In Denition 4.6.1, a set of clusters is constructed in such a way that the
clusters are mutually exclusive, the sum of records of all clusters is equal to the
total number of records, the size of each cluster is at least k and the number
of distinct sensitive attribute values is at least l to satisfy both the criteria of
k-anonymization and l-diversity. The problem tries to minimize the sum of all
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intra-cluster distances, where an intra-cluster distance of a cluster is dened as
the maximum distance between any two records in the cluster. In the following
subsection we formally design a systematic clustering algorithm for l-diversity.
4.6.2 Systematic clustering algorithm for l-diversity
Based on the information loss in Subsection (4.2.1) and the denition of the sys-
tematic clustering problem, we are now ready to discuss a systematic clustering
algorithm for the l-diversity model. As discussed, the whole procedure consists of
two steps, namely the clustering step for k-anonymization and the l-diverse step.
Clustering step for k-anonymization
The aim of this step is to develop a set of clusters from a given set of n records
that satisfy the k-anonymity requirement. The algorithm of the clustering step
for k-anonymization is the same as the algorithm for k-anonymity in Table 4.3.
l-diverse step
As discussed in the clustering step, we have some clusters that satisfy the
k-anonymity requirement but may or may not satisfy the l-diversity requirement.
Note that the l-diverse step is invoked only if in the rst step, some of the clus-
ters in the k-anonymization table do not satisfy the l-diversity requirement. If
for a certain l-value, all clusters in the anonymized table satisfy the l-diversity
requirement, the l-diverse step of the table is not required. According to this
step, remove the clusters that do not satisfy l-diversity requirements and add the
records contained in these clusters to other clusters that cause least information
loss. As the existing clusters already satisfy the k-anonymity and the l-diversity
requirement, inclusion of new records do not violate these requirement. The
algorithm of the l-diverse step is illustrated in Table 4.7.
Denition 4.6.2 (Systematic clustering decision problem for l-diversity) In a
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Table 4.7: l-diverse algorithm
Input: a partitioning =1 = f
1;
2; :::;
p1g of  that satisfy
k-anonymity requirement, a partitioning =?1 = f
?1;
?2; :::;
?p2g
of  that satisfy both the k-anonymity and the l-diversity
requirement, a set of sensitive attributes Si(i = 1; 2; 3; :::),
and the value of l for l-diversity.
Output: a partitioning = = f
1;
2; :::::g of  that satisfy
the l-diversity requirement.
1. Let  = fr1; r2; :::g=fall records of =1g
2. Let rj is the jth record of ;
3. For j = 1; 2; ::::;
4. For i = 1; 2; :::; p2;
5. Let IL?i :=InfoLoss(

?
i ), i = 1; 2; ::::p
?
2;
6. Find the cluster 
?i with lowest IL
?
i ;
7. Add rj to 

?
i ;
8. Next j;
given data set of n records, there is a clustering scheme = = f
1;
2; :::::g such
that
1. j 
i j k; 1 < k  n: the size of each cluster is greater than or equal to a
positive integer k,
2. l  2, the number of distinct sensitive attribute values in each cluster is at
least 2, and
3.
P
i=1 IL(
i) < c; c > 0: the total information loss of the clustering scheme
is less than a positive integer c.
where each cluster 
i(i = 1; 2; :::::) contains the records that are more similar to
each other with respect to k and l such that they require minimum generalization
and thus causes least information loss.
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have proposed an ecient algorithm for k- anonymization
to minimize information loss during the anonymization process and assure data
quality. The proposed technique uses the idea of clustering and we refer to this
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as the systematic clustering algorithm. The basic concepts of the proposed algo-
rithm were discussed and investigated through example and properties. The time
complexity of the developed algorithm is in O(n
2
k
), where n is the total number
of records containing individuals concerning their privacy. Finally a comparison
was made on the proposed algorithm with the k- member algorithm proposed by
Byun et al. [34] through experiment. For any k- anonymization algorithm, there
are two signicant criteria to judge the superiority of the algorithm, namely,
information loss and execution time. The experimental results show that the
proposed systematic clustering algorithm has a reasonable dominance over the
k- member algorithm. This shows the utility and the eciency of the proposed
clustering algorithm. A way out was also shown to be used for continuously
growing data without any violation of the k-anonymity requirement. Finally, we
have proposed algorithms for the l- diversity model as an enhanced version of
k-anonymity model. The proposed technique uses the idea of clustering and is
implemented in two steps, namely the clustering step for k-anonymization and
the l-diverse step.
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Part III
Statistical Disclosure Control (SDC)
Chapter 5
Systematic Microaggregation for
SDC
Microdata protection in statistical databases has recently become a major societal
concern and has been intensively studied in recent years. Statistical Disclosure
Control (SDC) is often applied to statistical databases before they are released for
public use. Microaggregation for SDC is a family of methods to protect microdata
from individual identication. SDC seeks to protect microdata in such a way that
they can be published and mined without providing any private information that
can be linked to specic individuals. Microaggregation works by partitioning the
microdata into clusters of at least k records and then replacing the records in
each cluster with the centroid of the cluster. This chapter presents a clustering
based microaggregation method for SDC to minimize the information loss.
5.1 Introduction
In recent years, the phenomenal advance of technological developments in infor-
mation technology enable government agencies and corporations to accumulate an
enormous amount of personal data for analytical purposes. These agencies and
organizations often need to release individual records (microdata) for research
and other public benet purposes. This propagation has to be in accordance
with laws and regulations to avoid the propagation of condential information.
In other words, microdata should be published in such a way that it preserves
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the privacy of the individuals. To protect personal data from individual identi-
cation, SDC is often applied before the data are released for analysis [2, 21]. The
purpose of microdata SDC is to alter the original microdata in such a way that
the statistical analysis from the original data and the modied data are similar
and the disclosure risk of identication is low. As SDC requires suppressing or
altering of the original data, the quality of data and the analysis results can be
damaged. Hence, SDC methods must nd a balance between data utility and per-
sonal condentiality. Microaggregation is a family of SDC methods for protecting
microdata sets that have been extensively studied recently [3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 115].
The basic idea of microaggregation is to partition a dataset into mutually ex-
clusive groups of at least k records prior to publication, and then publish the
centroid over each group instead of individual records. The resulting anonymized
dataset satises k-anonymity [18], requiring each record in a dataset to be iden-
tical to at least (k 1) other records in the same dataset. As releasing microdata
about individuals poses a privacy threat due to the privacy-related attributes,
called quasi-identiers, both k-anonymity and microaggregation only consider
the quasi-identiers. Microaggregation is traditionally restricted to numeric at-
tributes in order to calculate the centroid of records, but also has been extended
to handle categorical and ordinal attributes [4, 6, 19]. In this chapter we propose
a microaggregated method that is also applicable to numeric attributes.
The eectiveness of a microaggregation method is measured by calculating its
information loss. A lower information loss implies that the anonoymized dataset
is less distorted from the original dataset, and thus provides better data quality
for analysis. k- anonymity [17, 18] provides sucient protection of personal con-
dentiality of microdata, while to ensure the quality of the anonymized dataset,
an eective microaggregation method should incur as little information loss as
possible. In order to be useful in practice, the dataset should keep as much in-
formation as possible. Hence, it is necessary to seriously consider the tradeo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between privacy and information loss. To minimize the information loss due to
microaggregation, all records are partitioned into several groups such that each
group contains at least k similar records and then the records in each group
are replaced by their corresponding mean such that the values of each variable
are the same. In the context of data mining, clustering is a useful technique
that partitions records into groups such that records within a group are simi-
lar to each other, while records in dierent groups are most distinct from one
another. Thus, microaggregation can be seen as a clustering problem with con-
straints on the size of the clusters. Many microaggregation methods derive from
traditional clustering algorithms. For example, Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz
[3] proposed univariate and multivariate k-Ward algorithms that extend the ag-
glomerative hierarchical clustering method of Ward et al. [20]. Domingo-Ferrer
and Torra [114, 115] proposed a microaggregation method based on the fuzzy
c-means algorithm [1], and Laszlo and Mukherjee [11] extended the standard
minimum spanning tree partitioning algorithm for microaggregation [22]. All of
these microaggregation methods build all clusters gradually but simultaneously.
There are some other methods for microaggregation that have been proposed in
the literature that build one cluster at a time. Notable examples include Max-
imum Distance [14], Diameter-based Fixed-Size microaggregation and centroid-
based Fixed-size microaggregation [11], Maximum Distance to Average Vector
(MDAV) [3, 6], MHM [7] and the Two Fixed Reference Points method [23]. Most
recently, Lin et al. [24] proposed a density-based microaggregation method that
forms records by the descending order of their densities, and then ne-tunes these
clusters in reverse order.
All the works stated above proposed dierent microaggregation algorithms to
form the clusters, where within clusters the records are homogeneous but between
clusters the records are heterogeneous so that information loss is low. However,
no single microaggregation method outperforms other methods in terms of infor-
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mation loss. This work presents a new clustering method for microaggregation,
where all clusters are made simultaneously in a systematic way. According to
this method, sort all records by using a sorting function and partition all records
into [n
k
] clusters, where n is the total number of records and k is the k-anonymity
parameter. Randomly select a record r from the rst k records to form the
rst cluster and the rst records of the subsequent clusters form in a system-
atic way. Then adjust the records in each cluster in a systematic way such that
each cluster contains at least k records. Performance of the proposed method is
compared against the MDAV [3] as MDAV is the most widely used microaggrega-
tion method. The experimental results show that the proposed microaggregation
method outperforms MDAV with respect to both information loss and computa-
tional eciency.
5.2 Background
Microdata protection through microaggregation has been intensively studied in
recent years. Many techniques and methods have been proposed to deal with this
problem. In this section we describe some fundamental concepts of microaggrega-
tion. A microdata set V can be viewed as a le with n records, where each record
contains p attributes on an individual respondent. The attributes in an original
unprotected dataset can be classied in four categories which are not necessarily
disjoint:
 Identiers: These are attributes that unambiguously identify the respon-
dent. Examples are passport number, social security number, and full
name. Since our objective is to prevent condential information from be-
ing linked to specic respondents, we will assume in what follows that in a
pre-processing step, identiers in V have been removed.
 Quasi-identiers: A quasi-identiers is a set of attributes in V that in
combination can be linked with external information to re-identify (some
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of) the respondents to whom (some of) the records in V refer. Unlike iden-
tiers, quasi-identiers cannot be removed from V . The reason is that any
attribute in V potentially belongs to a quasi-identier depending on the ex-
ternal data sources available to the user of V . As releasing microdata about
individuals poses a privacy threat due to quasi-identiers, microaggregation
only considers the quasi-identiers.
 Condential outcome attributes: These are attributes which contain
sensitive information about the respondent. Examples are salary, religion,
political aliation, and health condition.
 Non-condential outcome attributes: Those attributes which contain
non-sensitive information about the respondent. Examples are town and
country of residence. Note that attributes of this kind cannot be neglected
when protecting a dataset because they can be part of a quasi-identier.
The purpose of microdata SDC can be stated more formally by saying that given
an original microdataset V , the goal is to release a protected microdataset V
0
in
such a way that
1. Disclosure risk (i.e., the risk that a user or an intruder can use V
0
to de-
termine condential attributes on a specic individual among those in V )
is low.
2. User analysis (regressions, means, etc.) on V
0
and V yield the same or at
least similar results. This is equivalent to requiring information loss caused
by SDC to be low, i.e., that the utility of the SDC-protected data should
stay high.
When we microaggregate data we should keep mind two goals: data utility
and preserving privacy of individuals. For preserving the data utility we should
introduce as little noise as possible into the data and preserving privacy data
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should be suciently modied in such a way that it is dicult for an adver-
sary to reidentify the corresponding individuals. Figure 5.1 shows an example of
microaggregated data where the individuals in each cluster are replaced by the
corresponding cluster mean. The gure shows that after aggregating the chosen
elements, it is impossible to distinguish them, so that the probability of linking
any respondent is inversely proportional to the number of aggregated elements.
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Figure 5.1: Example of Microaggregation using mean
Consider a microdata set T with p numeric attributes and n records, where
each record is represented as a vector in a p-dimensional space. For a given
positive integer k  n, a microaggregation method partitions T into g clusters
where each cluster contains at least k records (to satisfy k-anonymity), and then
replaces the records in each cluster with the centroid of the cluster. Let ni denote
the number of records in the ith cluster, and xij; 1  j  ni, denote the jth
record in the ith cluster. Then, ni  k for i = 1 to g, and
Pg
i=1 ni = n. The
centroid of the ith cluster, denoted by xi, is calculated as the average vector of
all the records in the ith cluster. In order to determine whether two records are
similar, a similarity function such as the Euclidean distance, Minkowski distance
or Chebyshev distance can be used. A common measure is the Sum of Squared
Errors (SSE). The SSE is the sum of squared distances from the centroid of each
cluster to every record in the cluster, and is dened as:
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SSE =
gX
i=1
niX
j=1
(xij   xi)0(xij   xi) (5.1)
The lower the SSE, the higher the within cluster homogeneity and higher the
SSE, the lower the within cluster homogeneity. If all the records in a cluster are
the same, then the SSE is zero indicating no information is lost. On the other
hand, if all the records in a cluster are more diverse, SSE is large indicating more
information is lost. Thus SSE can be treated as a measurement of information loss
due to microaggregation. In this chapter, we used SSE as a measure of informa-
tion loss during the microaggregation process. Therefore, the microaggregation
problem can be enumerated as a constraint optimization problem as follows:
Denition 5.2.1 (Microaggregation problem) Given a dataset T of n elements
and a positive integer k, nd a partitioning G = fG1; G2; :::; Ggg of T such that
1. Gi \Gj = , for all i 6= j = 1; 2; :::; p,
2. [pi=1Gi = T ,
3. SSE is minimized,
4. for all Gi 2 T , j Gi j k for any Gi 2 G.
The microaggregation problem stated above can be solved in polynomial time
for a univariate dataset [10] but has been shown to be NP hard for multivariate
dataset [13]. It is a natural expectation that SSE is low if the number of clusters
is large. Thus the number of records in each cluster should be kept close to k.
Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz [3] showed that no cluster should contain more
than (2k   1) records since such clusters can always be partitioned to further
reduce information loss.
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5.3 The Proposed Approach
This section presents the proposed systematic clustering-based algorithm for mi-
croaggregation that minimizes the information loss and satises the k-anonymity
requirement. The proposed approach builds and renes all clusters simultane-
ously.
5.3.1 Sorting Function
According to the proposed approach, rst sort all records with respect to the
attributes, so it is necessary to dene a sorting function to sort all the records
in the dataset. Consider a microdata set T with p numeric attributes, namely
Y1; Y2; :::; Yp and n records. Thus each record is represented as a vector in a p-
dimensional space. To sort all the records with respect to the numeric attributes,
we dene the jth sorted record in the dataset T as follows:
SFj =
pX
i=1
(yij   yi); j = 1; 2:::; n: (5.2)
where, yij is the jth record of the ith attribute and yi is the centroid of the ith
attribute. The sorting function (SF) stated above measures the distance between
the records and their corresponding centroid. In this study, the SF is arranged
in ascending order indicating records are arranged in order of magnitude. The
lower the values of SF, the more the records are below their respective centroid
and the higher the values of SF, the more the records are above their respective
centroid. Thus the records in the dataset T , sorted in ascending order, based on
the SF and the rst and the last record, are most distant among all other records
in the dataset T .
5.3.2 Systematic microaggregation algorithm
Based on the information loss measure in equation (5.1) and the denition of the
microaggregation problem, we are now ready to discuss the systematic clustering-
based microaggregation algorithm. The general idea of the algorithm is as follows.
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Table 5.1: Systematic clustering-based microaggregation algorithm
Input: a dataset T of n records and a positive integer k
Output: a partitioning G = fG1; G2; :::; Ggg of T
where g = jGj and Gi  k for i = 1 to g.
1. Sort all records in T in ascending order by using the SF
in equation (5.2);
2. Let g:= intbnk c;
3. Get randomly k distinct records r1; r2; :::; rk from rst 1 to k;
4. Let xij is the jth record in the ith cluster;
5. For i = 1 to g;
6. Let xi1 := T[r1+k(i 1)];
7. Next i;
8. For j := 2 to k;
9. For i := 1 to g;
10. Let ILi: = InfoLoss(T[rj+k(i 1)]);
11. Let N := Find cluster number with lowest ILi;
12. where cluster size  k;
13. Add T[rj+k(i 1)] to gn;
14. Next i;
15. Next j;
16. Let e := (n  gk);
17. Find extra element E1; E2; :::; Ee 2 E;
18. For k := 1 to e;
19. For m := 1 to g;
20. Let ILm := InfoLoss(Ek) in cluster m;
21. Next m;
22. Let N := Find cluster with lowest IL;
23. Add Ek to gn;
24. Next k;
According to this method rst sort all records in ascending order by using
the sorting function in equation (5.2). Then identify the equivalence class and
the number of clusters by, g = n
k
, where n is the total number of records in the
dataset T , and k is the anonymity parameter for k-anonymization. Round this
as integer and randomly select a record ri from the rst k records as seed to form
the rst cluster. If there are g clusters to be formed then select the (ri + k)th,
(ri + 2k)th,..., fri + (g   1)kgth records in a systematic way to form the 2nd,
3rd, ..., gth cluster respectively. Select another record rj(j 6= i) from the rst k
records and add this record to the cluster which causes the least information loss.
Similarly, in a systematic way, select (rj + k)th, (rj + 2k)th,..., frj + (g  1)kgth
records and add these records to their respective clusters that cause least infor-
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mation loss. If any cluster size is exactly k, stop adding records to that cluster
and continue the same process until all records of the rst k records nish. If n is
not exactly divisible by k and there are still some records left, add these records
to their closest clusters that incur least information loss. A systematic microag-
gregation algorithm endeavors to build all clusters simultaneously, whereas most
of the microaggregation algorithms in the literature build one/two cluster(s) at a
time. The algorithm selects the rst record randomly and the subsequent records
form in a systematic way. As the records in the dataset T are arranged in as-
cending order and the rst record of each cluster forms in every kth distance,
the rst record of each cluster contains a non identical value, so this algorithm
easily captures if there are any extreme values in the dataset. The systematic
microaggregation algorithm is shown in Table 5.1.
Denition 5.3.1 (Systematic clustering-based microaggregation decision prob-
lem) In a given dataset T of n records, there is a clustering schemeG = fG1; G2; :::;
Ggg such that
1. j Gi j k; 1 < k  n: the size of each cluster is greater than or equal to a
positive integer k, and
2.
Pg
i=1 IL(Gi) < c; c > 0: the total information loss of the clustering scheme
is less than a positive integer c.
where each cluster Gi(i = 1; 2; :::; p) contains the records that are more similar to
each other such that the cluster means are close to the values of the clusters and
thus causes least information loss.
5.4 Experimental Results
The objective of our experiment is to investigate the recital of our approach in
terms of data quality and the computational eciency. This section experimen-
CHAPTER 5. SYSTEMATIC MICROAGGREGATION FOR SDC 104
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
k−value and Information loss(n=10,000, p=2 )
k
To
ta
l i
nf
o
rm
a
tio
n 
Lo
ss
MDAV
Systematic clustering
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
k−value and Information loss(n=10,000, p=3 )
k
To
ta
l i
nf
o
rm
a
tio
n 
Lo
ss
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
k−value and Information loss(n=10,000, p=4 )
k
To
ta
l i
nf
o
rm
a
tio
n 
Lo
ss
MDAV
Systematic clustering
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
k−value and Information loss(n=10,000, p=5 )
k
To
ta
l i
nf
o
rm
a
tio
n 
Lo
ss
MDAV
Systematic clustering
5 10 15 20 25 30 35
0
50000
100000
150000
k−value and Information loss(n=10,000, p=6 )
k
To
ta
l i
nf
o
rm
a
tio
n 
Lo
ss
MDAV
Systematic clustering
Figure 5.2: Information Loss comparison for no. of attributes between 2 and 6
tally evaluates the eectiveness and eciency of the systematic clustering-based
microaggregation algorithm. For this purpose, we utilize a real dataset CENSUS1
containing personal information of 500 thousands American adults. The dataset
has 9 discrete attributes.
To accurately evaluate our approach, the performance of the proposed algo-
rithm is compared in this section with MDAV [3] as until now MDAV is the most
widely used microaggregation method. For the experiment we have selected 10
thousands records randomly from the whole dataset and run the experiment for
1Downloadable at http://www.ipums.org.
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Figure 5.3: Running time comparison using census datset for no. of attributes
between 2 and 6
k = 5; 10; :::; 35 and for dierent situations of number of attributes, p = 2; 3; :::; 6.
5.4.1 Data Quality and Eciency
In this section, we report experimental results for the systematic clustering-based
microaggregation algorithm for data quality and execution eciency. In this
chapter, SSE dened in equation (5.1) is used to measure the information loss
due to microaggregation.
Figure 5.2 reports the information loss of both the MDAV and the systematic
clustering-based microaggregation algorithms for increasing the values of k and
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Figure 5.4: Cardinality and Runtime
p, where p is the number of attributes in the dataset. With the increase of k, the
information loss is increasing for both the algorithms. As the gure illustrates,
the systematic clustering-based microaggregation algorithm results in the lowest
cost of the information loss for both all k and p values. The superiority of our
algorithm over the MDAV algorithm results from the fact that our algorithm
easily captures if there are any extreme values because of sorting function and
the systematic way of selecting records in the clusters.
On the other hand, Figure 5.3 displays the execution (running) time of both
the algorithms. In general the running time is decreasing with the increase of k
in all scenarios. Figure 5.3 clearly shows that the running time of the proposed
algorithm with all dierent scenarios is much less than the MDAV algorithm
for almost all values of k. However, as shown in Figure 5.3, for some moderate
values of k, the running time of the proposed algorithm is little bit more (in
some situations) than the MDAV. We believe this is still acceptable in practice
considering its better performance with respect to the information loss.
5.4.2 Scalability
Figure 5.4 shows the execution time behaviors of the systematic clustering-based
microaggregation algorithm for various cardinalities with p = 6 and k = 10. For
this experiment we used subsets of the Census dataset with dierent sizes. As
shown, the running time increases almost linearly with the size of the dataset
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for our proposed algorithm. Again the proposed algorithm introduces the least
information loss for any p and k. This shows that our approach preserves the
quality of the data and is highly scalable.
5.5 Conclusion
Microaggregation is an eective method of protecting privacy in microdata. This
chapter has presented a new systematic clustering-based microaggregation method
for numerical attributes. The new method consists of clustering individuals
records in microdata in a number of disjointed clusters in a systematic way prior
to publication and then publish the mean over each cluster instead of individual
records. A comparison has been made between the proposed algorithm and the
most widely used microaggregation method, called MDAV through an experi-
ment. In the microaggregation problem, the performance of a method is judged
by both information loss and running time. A method that incurs less information
loss and has less execution time is a powerful method. The experimental results
show that the proposed algorithm has a signicant dominance over the MDAV
method with respect to both information loss and execution time. Finally the
results show through experiment that the proposed algorithm is highly scalable.
Chapter 6
A Pairwise-Systematic
Microaggregation
In Chapter 5, we have developed a systematic clustering-based microaggregation
method for SDC. The algorithm works well and has less execution time. However,
the algorithm is sometimes aected by extreme values. If the dataset contains
outliers, the systematic algorithm nally forces us to add those in the clusters
whose size is less than k and that may cause more information loss. To overcome
this problem, this chapter presents a pairwise systematic (P-S) microaggrega-
tion method to minimize the information loss. The proposed technique adopts a
method that simultaneously forms two distant groups at a time with correspond-
ing similar records together in a systematic way and then anonymizes with the
centroid of each group individually.
6.1 Introduction
As discussed in the previous chapter, dierent microaggregation algorithms pro-
posed in the literature form the clusters, where within clusters the records are
homogeneous but between clusters the records are heterogeneous such that in-
formation loss is low. The level of privacy required is controlled by a security
parameter k, the minimum number of records in a cluster. In essence, the pa-
rameter k species the maximum acceptable disclosure risk. Once a value for k
has been selected by the data protector, the only job left is to maximize data util-
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ity. Maximizing utility can be achieved by microaggregating optimally, i.e. with
minimum within-groups variability loss. So the main challenge in microaggrega-
tion is to minimize the information loss during the clustering process. Although
plenty of work has been done [3, 4, 6, 9, 10, 115], to maximize the data utility
by forming the clusters, this is not yet sucient in terms of information loss.
So more research needs to be done to form the clusters such that the informa-
tion loss is as low as possible. Observing this challenge, this chapter presents
a new clustering-based method for microaggregation, where two distant clusters
are made simultaneously in a systematic way. According to this method, sort
all records in ascending order by using a sorting function so that the rst record
and the last record are most distant to each other. Form a cluster with the rst
record and its (k   1) nearest records and another cluster with the last record
and its (k   1) nearest records. Sort the remaining records ((n   2k), if dataset
contains n records) by using the same sorting function and continue to build pair
clusters at the same time by using the rst and the last record as seeds until some
specied records remain. Finally form one/two cluster(s) depending on the re-
maining records. Thus all clusters produced in this way contain k records except
the last cluster that may contain at the most (2k 1) records. Performance of the
proposed method is compared against the most recent widely used microaggrega-
tion methods. The experimental results show that the proposed microaggregation
method outperforms the recent methods in the literature in all test situations.
6.2 Previous Microaggregation Methods
Previous microaggregation methods have been roughly divided into two cate-
gories, namely xed-size and data-oriented microaggregation [3, 7]. For xed-size
microaggregation, the partition is done by dividing a dataset into clusters that
have size k, except perhaps one cluster which has a size between k and (2k   1),
depending on the total number of records n and the anonymity parameter k. For
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the data-oriented microaggregation, the partition is done by allowing all clus-
ters with sizes between k and (2k   1). Intuitively, xed-size methods reduce
the search space, and thus are more computationally ecient than data-oriented
methods [24]. However, data-oriented methods can adapt to dierent values of k
and various data distributions and thus may achieve lower information loss than
xed-size methods.
Domingo-Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz [3] proposed a multivariate xed-size mi-
croaggregation method, later called the Maximum Distance (MD) method [14].
The MD method repeatedly locates the two records that are most distant to each
other, and forms two clusters with their respective (k   1) nearest records until
fewer than 2k records remain. If at least k records remain, it then forms a new
cluster with all remaining records. Finally when there are fewer than k records
not assigned to any cluster yet, this algorithm then individually assigns these
records to their closest clusters. This method has a time complexity of O(n3)
and works well for most datasets. Laszlo and Mukherjee [11] modied the last
step of the MD method such that each remaining record is added to its own
nearest cluster and proposed Diameter-based Fixed-size microaggregation. This
method is however not a xed size method because it allows more than one cluster
to have more than k records.
The MDAV method is the most widely used microaggregation method [14].
MDAV is the same as MD except in the rst step. MDAV nds the record r
that is furthest from the current centroid of the dataset and the record s that
is furthest from r instead of nding the two records that are most distant to
each other, as is done in MD. Then form a cluster with r and its (k   1) nearest
records and form another cluster with s and its (k   1) nearest records. For
the remaining records, repeat this process until fewer than 2k records remain. If
between k and (2k   1) records remain, MDAV simply forms a new cluster with
all of the remaining records. On the other hand, if the number of the remaining
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records is below k, it adds all of the remaining records to their nearest clusters.
So MDAV is a xed size method. Lin et al. [24] proposed a modied MDAV,
called MDAV-1. The MDAV-1 is similar to MDAV except when the number
of the remaining records is between k and (2k   1), a new cluster is formed
with the record that is the furthest from the centroid of the remaining records,
and its (k   1) nearest records. Any remaining records are then added to their
respective nearest clusters. Experimental results indicate that MDAV-1 incurs
slightly less information loss than MDAV [24]. Another variant of the MDAV
method, called MDAV-generic, is proposed by Domingo-Ferrer and Torra [6],
where by the threshold 2k is altered to 3k. If between 2k and (3k   1) records
remain, then nd the record r that is furthest from the centroid of the remaining
records and form a cluster with r and its (k   1) nearest records and another
cluster with the remaining records. Finally when fewer than 2k records remain,
this algorithm then forms a new cluster with all the remaining records. Laszlo
and Mukherjee [11] proposed another method, called Centroid-based Fixed-size
microaggregation that is also based on a centroid but builds only one cluster
during each iteration. This algorithm rst nd a record r that is furthest from
the current centroid of the dataset and then nds a cluster with r and its (k  1)
nearest records. For the remaining records repeat the same process until fewer
than k records remain. Finally add each remaining record to its nearest clusters.
This method is not a xed-size method as more than one cluster has more than
k records.
Solanas et al. [16] proposed a variable-size variant of MDAV, called V-MDAV.
V-MDAV rst builds a new cluster of k records and then tries to extend this
up to (2k   1)records based on some criteria. V-MDAV adopts a user-dened
parameter to control the threshold of adding more records to a cluster. Chang et
al. [23] proposed the Two Fixed Reference Points (TFRP) method to accelerate
the clustering process of k-anonymization. During the rst phase, TFRP selects
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two extreme points calculated from the dataset. Let Nmin and Nmax be the
minimum and maximum values over all attributes in the datasets respectively,
then one reference point G1 has Nmin as its value for all attributes, and another
reference point G2 has Nmax as its value for all attributes. A cluster of k records
is then formed with the record r that is the furthest from G1 and the (k   1)
nearest records to r. Similarly another cluster of k records is formed with the
record s that is the furthest from G2 and (k  1) nearest records to s. These two
steps are repeated until fewer than k records remain. Finally, these remaining
records are assigned to their respective nearest clusters. This method is quite
ecient as G1 and G2 are xed throughout the iterations. When all clusters are
generated, TFRP applies an enhancement step to determine whether a cluster
should be retained or decomposed and added to other clusters.
Lin et al. [24] proposed a density-based algorithm (DBA) for microaggrega-
tion. The DBA has two dierent scenarios. The rst state of DBA (DBA-1)
repeatedly builds a new cluster using the k-neighborhood of the record with the
highest k-density among all records that are not yet assigned to any cluster until
fewer than k unassigned records remain. These remaining records are then as-
signed to their respective nearest clusters. The DBA-1 partitions the dataset into
some clusters, where each cluster contains no fewer than k records. The second
state of DBA (DBA-2) attempts to ne-tune all clusters by checking whether
to decompose a cluster and merge its content with other clusters. Notably, all
clusters are checked during the DBA-2 by the reverse of the order that they were
added to clusters in the DBA-1. After several clusters are removed and their
records are added to their nearest clusters in the DBA-2, some clusters may con-
tain more than (2k 1) records. At the end of the DBA-2, the MDAV-1 algorithm
is applied to each cluster with size above (2k  1) to reduce the information loss.
This state is nally called MDAV-2. Experimental results show that the DBA
attains a reasonable dominance over the latest microaggregation methods.
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All of the microaggregation methods described above repeatedly choose one/
two records according to various heuristics and form one/two cluster(s) with the
chosen records and their respective (k   1) other records. However there are
other microaggregation methods that build all clusters simultaneously and work
by initially forming multiple clusters of records in the form of trees, where each
tree represent a cluster. Heuristics are then applied to either decompose a tree
to reduce the cluster size to be fewer than 2k or merge trees to raise the cluster
size to be greater than or equal to k. Instead of using trees, other methods may
adaptively adjust the number of clusters to ensure that the size of each cluster is
between k and (2k   1).
The multivariate k-Ward algorithm [3] rst nds the two records that are
furthest from each other in the dataset and build two clusters from these two
records and their respective (k 1) nearest records. Each of the remaining record
then forms its own cluster. These clusters are repeatedly merged until all clusters
have at least k records. Finally the algorithm is recursively applied to each cluster
containing 2k or more records. The k-Ward algorithm tends to generate large
clusters, consequently increasing the information loss. For instance, this method
could merge two clusters, each with (k   1) records to form a large cluster of
(2k 2) records. The minimum spanning tree microaggregation method [11] rst
builds a minimal spanning tree (MST) of the dataset using the Prim method
[25]. Then, as in the standard MST partitioning algorithm [22], the longest edge
is recursively removed to form a forest of subtrees of the MST. However, unlike in
the standard MST partitioning algorithm, the longest edge is removed only if both
the resulting subtrees contain at least k nodes. Finally, another microaggregation
method (such as MDAV) is applied to those groups containing more than 2k
records. According to the experimental results reported by Laszlo and Mukherjee
[11], this method has the same complexity as the multivariate k-Ward algorithm
but causes less information loss. However, it still tends to generate large groups
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and works well only if the dataset has well-separated clusters.
Domingo-Ferrer et al. [8] proposed a multivariate microaggregation method
called -Approx. This method rst builds a forest and then decomposes the trees
in the forest such that all trees have sizes between k and max(2k   1; 3k   5).
Finally, for any tree with a size greater than (2k   1), nd the node in the tree
that is furthest from the centroid of the tree. Form a cluster with this node and
its (k 1) nearest records in the tree and form another cluster with the remaining
records in the tree.
Hansen and Mukherjee [10] proposed a microaggregation method for univari-
ate dataset called, HM. This method converts a dataset into a directed acyclic
graph based on the ordering of the records and then transforms the microaggrega-
tion problem into the shortest path problem, which can be solved in polynomial
time. This method cannot be applied directly to multivariate datasets since these
only have a partial ordering among records. After that Domingo-Ferrer et al. [7]
proposed a multivariate version of the HM method, called MHM. This method
rst uses various heuristics, such as nearest point next (NPN), maximum dis-
tance (MD) or MDAV to order the multivariate records. Steps similar to the HM
method are then applied to generate clusters based on this ordering. Domingo-
Ferrer et al. [115] proposed a microaggregation method based on a fuzzy c-means
algorithm (FCM) [1]. This method repeatedly runs FCM to adjust the two pa-
rameters of FCM (one is the number of clusters c and another is the exponent for
the partition matrix m) until each cluster contains at least k records. The value
of c is initially large (and m is small) and is gradually reduced (increased) during
the repeated FCM runs to reduce the size of each cluster. The same process is
then recursively applied to those clusters with 2k or more records. Genetic algo-
rithms (GAs) have also been applied to the microaggregation problem. Solanas
et al. [15] encoded a partitioning of a dataset as a chromosome of n genes, where
n is the number of records in the dataset and the value of the ith gene indicates
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the cluster number of the ith record in the dataset. Since each cluster contains at
least k records, each cluster number is an integer in the interval [1; bn
k
c]. When
generating the initial population of chromosomes and performing genetic oper-
ations on these chromosomes, special care must be taken to avoid generating a
chromosome where any cluster numbers appear fewer than k or more than 2k
times in their n genes. The experimental results showed that this method works
well for small datasets (n  50). Therefore they recommended rst using a xed-
size microaggregation method such as MDAV to generate clusters with k = 50
and then applying GA for the real intended k value for each cluster. This two-step
method was later studied by Martnez-Ballest et al. [12] and was also published
in Solanas [14].
6.3 Information Loss
The notion of information loss is used to quantify the amount of information
that is lost due to microaggregation. This section describes the measurement of
information loss used to test the eectiveness of the P-S microaggregation method
proposed in this chapter. Consider a microdata set T with p numeric attributes
and n records, where each record is represented as a vector in a p-dimensional
space. For a given positive integer k  n, a microaggregation method partitions
T into g clusters, where each cluster contains at least k records (to satisfy k-
anonymity), and then replaces the records in each cluster with the centroid of the
cluster. Let ni denote the number of records in the ith cluster, and xij; 1  j  ni,
denote the jth record in the ith cluster. Then, ni  k for i = 1 to g, andPg
i=1 ni = n. The centroid of the ith cluster, denoted by xi is calculated as the
average vector of all the records in the ith cluster.
In the same way, the centroid of T , denoted by x, is the average vector of all
the records in T . Information loss is used to quantify the amount of information
of a dataset that is lost after applying a microaggregation method. In this chapter
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we use the most common denition of information loss by Domingo-Ferrer and
Mateo-Sanz [3] as follows:
IL =
SSE
SST
(6.1)
where SSE is the within-cluster squared error, calculated by summing the
Euclidean distance of each record xij to the average value xi as follows:
SSE =
gX
i=1
niX
j=1
(xij   xi)0(xij   xi) (6.2)
and SST is the sum of squared error within the entire dataset T , calculated by
summing the Euclidean distance of each record xij to the average value x as
follows:
SST =
gX
i=1
niX
j=1
(xij   x)0(xij   x) (6.3)
For a given dataset T , SST is xed regardless of how T is partitioned. On
the other hand, SSE varies per dataset depending on the partition of the dataset.
In essence, SSE measures the similarity of the records in a cluster. The lower the
SSE, the higher the within cluster homogeneity and the higher the SSE, the lower
the within cluster homogeneity. If all the records in a cluster are the same, then
the SSE is zero indicating no information is lost. On the other hand, if all the
records in a cluster are more diverse, SSE is large indicating more information is
lost. In this chapter, we used SSE as a measure of similarity indicating a record
will be included in a particular cluster if it causes least SSE among all other
records in the dataset.
6.4 Pairwise-Systematic microaggregation algo-
rithm
This section presents the proposed pairwise systematic algorithm for microaggre-
gation that minimizes the information loss and satises the k-anonymity require-
ment. The proposed approach builds on and renes simultaneously two distant
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Figure 6.1: P-S microaggregation algorithm
clusters at a time with the corresponding similar records together in a systematic
way.
Based on the information loss measure in equation (6.1) and the denition
of the microaggregation problem, we are now ready to discuss the Pairwise-
Systematic (P-S) microaggregation algorithm.
According to this method, rst sort all records of n in the dataset T in as-
cending order by using the SF in equation (5.2). Thus in the sorting dataset, the
rst record and the last record are the most distant to each other among all other
pair records in the dataset T . The algorithm (see Fig. 6.1) repeatedly builds
pair clusters using the rst record and the last record in the sorting dataset and
their corresponding (k   1) nearest records until fewer than 3k records remain
(see steps 2-6 of Fig. 6.1). The nearest records in a cluster are chosen in such a
way that the inclusion of these records causes less SSE than the other records in
the dataset. If between 2k and (3k   1) records remain, then sort these records
in ascending order by using the same sorting function in equation (5.2) and nd
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the rst record f . Form a cluster with f and its (k   1) nearest records, and
another cluster with the remaining records (see step 7 of Fig. 6.1). Moreover, if
fewer than 2k records remain, then form a new cluster with all remaining records
(see step 9 of Fig. 6.1).
The P-S microaggregation algorithm stated above endeavor to repeatedly
build two clusters simmultaneously in a systematic way. As the records in the
dataset T are arranged in ascending order and the rst record and the last record
are most distant to each other, building clusters in this systematic way, the algo-
rithm easily captures if there are any extreme values in the dataset.
Denition 6.4.1 (Pair-wise systematic clustering-based microaggregation deci-
sion problem) In a given dataset T of n records, there is a clustering scheme
G = fG1; G2; :::; Ggg such that
1. j Gi j k; 1 < k  n: the size of each cluster is greater than or equal to a
positive integer k, and
2.
Pg
i=1 IL(Gi) < c; c > 0: the total information loss of the clustering scheme
is less than a positive integer c.
where each cluster Gi(i = 1; 2; :::; p) contains the records that are more similar to
each other such that the cluster means are close to the values of the clusters and
thus cause the least information loss.
6.5 Experimental Results
The objective of our experiment is to investigate the recital of our approach in
terms of data quality. This section experimentally evaluates the eectiveness of
the P-S microaggregation algorithm. The following three datasets [7], which have
been used as benchmarks in previous studies to evaluate various microaggrega-
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Table 6.1: Information loss comparison using Tarragona dataset
Method k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 10
MDAV-MHM 16:9326 22:4617 33:1923
MD-MHM 16:9829 22:5269 33:1834
CBFS-MHM 16:9714 22:8227 33:2188
NPN-MHM 17:3949 27:0213 40:1831
M-d 16:6300 19:66 24:5000 38:5800
-Approx 17:10 20:51 26:04 38:80
TFRP-1 17:228 19:396 22:110 33:186
TFRP-2 16:881 19:181 21:847 33:088
MDAV-1 16:93258762 19:54578612 22:46128236 33:19235838
MDAV-2 16:38261429 19:01314997 22:07965363 33:17932950
DBA-1 20:69948803 23:82761456 26:00129826 35:39295837
DBA-2 16:15265063 22:67107728 25:45039236 34:80675148
P-S 5.494040549 8.329209112 10.8749404 17.01194228
Table 6.2: Information loss comparison using Census dataset
Method k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 10
MDAV-MHM 5:6523 9:0870 14:2239
MD-MHM 5:69724 8:98594 14:3965
CBFS-MHM 5:6734 8:8942 13:8925
NPN-MHM 6:3498 11:3443 18:7335
M-d 6:1100 8:24 10:3000 17:1700
-Approx 6:25 8:47 10:78 17:01
TFRP-1 5:931 7:880 9:357 14:442
TFRP-2 5:803 7:638 8:980 13:959
MDAV-1 5:692186279 7:494699833 9:088435498 14:15593043
MDAV-2 5:656049371 7:409645342 9:012389597 13:94411775
DBA-1 6:144855154 9:127883805 10:84218735 15:78549732
DBA-2 5:581605762 7:591307664 9:046162117 13:52140518
P-S 1.782851535 2.54581108 2.698883298 4.967556756
tion methods, were adopted in our experiments.
1. The \Tarragona" dataset contains 834 records with 13 numerical attributes.
2. The \Census" dataset contains 1,080 records with 13 numerical attributes.
3. The \EIA" dataset contains 4,092 records with 11 numeric attributes (plus
two additional categorical attributes not used here).
To accurately evaluate our approach, the performance of the proposed P-S
microaggregation algorithm is compared in this section with various microaggre-
gation methods. Tables 6.1-6.3 show the information losses of these microag-
gregation methods. The lowest information loss for each dataset and each k
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Table 6.3: Information loss comparison using EIA dataset
Method k = 3 k = 4 k = 5 k = 10
MDAV-MHM 0:4081 1:2563 3:7725
MD-MHM 0:4422 1:2627 3:6374
NPN-MHM 0:5525 0:9602 2:3188
-Approx 0:43 0:59 0:83 2:26
TFRP-1 0:530 0:661 1:651 3:242
TFRP-2 0:428 0:599 0:910 2:590
MDAV-1 0:482938725 0:671345141 1:666657361 3:83966422
MDAV-2 0:411101515 0:587381756 0:946263963 3:16085577
DBA-1 1:090194828 0:84346907 1:895536919 4:265801303
DBA-2 0:421048322 0:559755523 0:81849828 2:080980825
P-S 0.213174523 0.32351185 0.435562877 1.044292097
value is shown in bold face. The information losses of methods DBA-1, DBA-2,
MDAV-1 and MDAV-2 are quoted from [24]; the information losses of methods
MDAV-MHM, MD-MHM, CBFS-MHM, NPN-MHM and M-d (for k = 3; 5; 10)
are quoted from [7]; the information losses of methods -Approx and M-d (for
k = 4) are quoted from [8], and the information losses of methods TFRP-1 and
TFRP-2 are quoted from [23]. TFRP is a two-stage method and its two stages
are denoted as TRFP-1 and TRFP-2 respectively. The TFRP-2 is similar to the
DBA-2 but disallows merging a record to a group of size over (4k   1):
Tables 6.1-6.3 show the information loss for several values of k and for the
Tarragona, Census and for the EIA datasets respectively. The information loss is
compared with the P-S microaggregation algorithm among the latest microaggre-
gation methods listed above. Information loss is measured as SSESST 100, where
SST is the total sum of the squares of the dataset. Note that the within-groups
sum of squares SSE is never greater than SST so that the reported information
loss measure takes values in the range [0,100]. Tables 6.1-6.3 illustrate that in all
of the test situations, the P-S microaggregation algorithm causes signicantly less
information loss than any of the microaggregation methods listed in the table.
Essentially, the P-S microaggregation algorithm causes less than 50% informa-
tion loss compared to any of the previous methods listed above and for any of the
datasets. This shows the utility and the eectiveness of the proposed algorithm.
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6.6 Conclusion
Microaggregation is an eective method in SDC of protecting privacy in mi-
crodata and has been extensively used world-wide. The level of privacy re-
quired is controlled by a parameter k, often called anonymity parameter for
k-anonymization that is basically the minimum number of records in a clus-
ter. Once the value of k has been chosen, the data protector and the data
users are interested in minimizing the information loss. This chapter has pre-
sented a new Pairwise-Systematic (P-S) microaggregation method for numerical
attributes. The new method consists of pairwise clustering individual records in
microdata in a number of disjointed clusters in a systematic way using a sorting
function prior publication and then publishing the mean over each cluster instead
of individual records. A comparison has been made of the proposed algorithm
with the most widely used microaggregation methods through experimenting with
the three benchmark datasets (Tarragona, Census and the EIA). The experimen-
tal results show that the proposed algorithm has a signicant dominance over
the recent microaggregation methods with respect to information loss. Thus the
proposed method is very eective in preserving the privacy of respondents' con-
tributions to microdata sets and can be used as a microaggregation method in
SDC.
Chapter 7
Median-based Microaggragation
for SDC
In this chapter, we introduce a new microaggregation method, where the centroid
is considered as median. The new method guarantees the microaggregated data
and the original data to be similar by using a statistical test. Another contribution
of this chapter is that we propose a distance metric, called absolute deviation from
median (ADM) to evaluate the amount of mutual information among the records
in microdata.
7.1 Motivation
As stated before, the rationale behind microaggregation is to divide the dataset
into some groups, where each group contains at least k records. For each variable,
the average value over each group is computed and is used to replace each of
the original averaged values. Groups are formed using a criterion of maximum
similarity. Once the procedure has been completed, the resulting dataset can be
published. Now a natural question arise, which relates to what centroid value
should be used instead of individual records in each group, as the common center
values that describe a set of values are mean, median and mode. The simplest
answer is to use that value which apparently guarantees that the modied data
and the original data are similar by using a statistical test. Previously the mean
was used as a centroid value but it does not guarantee the similar modied data
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and the original data. In this chapter we used median as the center value as it
shows through a sign test that the modication has no eect and produces similar
modied and original data. There are also some advantages of using median as the
center value. Firstly, median is the appropriate measure for skewed distribution.
If the records in each group follow skewed distribution, median should be used as
the measure of central tendency. Mean is the appropriate measure for symmetric
distribution; however, for symmetric distribution mean and median are equal
and thus there is no dierence between using mean or median as the center
value. Secondly, mean is aected by extreme values, which means if a group
contains any extreme values the total information loss will be increased. However,
median is not at all aected by extreme values and lastly it is computationally
more convenient to use median to measure the distortion of the original data.
The distortion is measured as the dierence between the original values and the
modied values, but the sum of these dierences is zero if mean is used as the
center value. Thus sum of squares of dierences is normally used to measure the
distortion, if the mean is used as a center value that is computationally dicult.
However, these sum of dierences is not zero if median is used as a center value
and the sum of absolute dierences can be used to measure the distortion that
is computationally less dicult. Using median as the center value produces a
similar original but not the same data set, so there is still a chance of loss of
information. Thus the eectiveness of a microaggregation method is measured
by calculating its information loss. A lower information loss implies that the
anonymized dataset is less distorted than the original dataset, and thus provides
better data quality for analysis. As median is used as a measure of location to
represent each group, in this chapter we propose the sum of absolute deviations
from median (ADM) to measure the information loss that is always less than
the SSE. That means that using ADM as a measure of information loss always
produces less information loss than the SSE. Thus the proposed median based
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microaggregation method has the following features:
 It divides the whole microdata set into a number of mutually exclusive and
exhaustive groups prior to publication and then publishes the median over
each group instead of individual records.
 It guarantees that the modication has no eect and the modied data and
the original data are similar by using a statistical test.
 As microaggregated data causes information loss, it uses the sum of absolute
deviations from median (ADM) as a measure of distortion that is always
less than the so called distortion measure sum of squares of errors (SSE).
7.2 The Proposed Approach
Microdata protection through microaggregation has been intensively studied in
recent years. Many techniques and methods have been proposed to deal with this
problem. In this section we rst describe some basic concept of microaggregation
and a proposed approach of microaggregation.
When we microaggregate data we should keep in mind two goals, data utility
and preserving privacy of individuals. For preserving the data utility we should
introduce as little noise as possible into the data and preserving privacy data
should be suciently modied in such a way that it is dicult for an adversary
to re-identify the corresponding individuals. Figure 7.1 and Figure 7.2 show
examples of microaggregated data where in Figure 7.1, the centroid is replaced
by a mean and in Figure 7.2, the centroid is replaced by a median. Both the gures
show that after aggregating the chosen elements, it is impossible to distinguish
them, so that the probability of linking any respondent is inversely proportional
to the number of aggregated elements.
Now it is necessary to check which gure shows similar original data and
microaggregated data by using a statistical test. The sign test can be used to
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Figure 7.2: Example of Microaggregation using median
test the hypothesis that there is no dierence between the distributions of original
data and the microaggregated data. Both the gures consist of three groups and
each group has four elements. The rst group consists of the elements 45, 42,
51 and 46, the second group consists of the elements 2, 5, 6 and 11, and the
third group consists of the elements 31, 22, 26 and 25, where in Figure 7.1 these
values are replaced by their corresponding group mean and in Figure 7.2 these
values are replaced by their corresponding group median. We would now like to
test whether the original data and the micrioaggregated data are similar. Set
up a null hypothesis H0: the microaggregation method has no eect and the
alternative hypothesis is Ha: the microaggregation method has an eect. Take
the dierence between microaggregated data from original data, give a \+" sign
if the dierence is positive and give a \   " sign if the dierence is negative.
We omit pairs for which there is no dierence and count the number of positive
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dierences (X).
If we use median as centroid value then total pairs is, n = 12 (as no tie) and
the number of positive sign is, X = 6. This is exactly what we would expect
if there is no dierence. Thus we can not reject H0, as there is no evidence to
support the hypothesis that the microaggregation method has an eect. This
means the modication has no eect and both the microaggregated data and the
modied data are similar. So, it can be concluded that using median as centroid
value always gives a guarantee of producing similar original and modied data.
This is true for any dataset as median is the middle most observations in a set of
values.
By contrast, if we use mean as centroid value then total pairs is, n = 12 3 = 9
(as three tie) and the number of positive signs is, X = 3. This is not exactly what
we would expect if there is no dierence, which means we can not say anything
unless we get p-value as the acceptance or rejection of H0 depends on p-value.
Thus, there is no grantee that the microaggregated data and the original data
are similar. For some cases this may be true but it is not universally true for any
particular dataset. Therefore, it can be concluded that using mean as centroid
value does not give any guarantee of producing similar original and modied data
for any dataset.
As discussed, the microaggregation method using median provides sucient
evidence that the modied data are similar to the original data, and in this
chapter we propose to use median as the centroid point of each group. Thus before
publishing, microdata should be partitioned into some groups so that within
groups the records are closer to each other and between groups the records are
more distant to each other, and then publish the median over each group instead
of individual records.
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7.3 Proposed distortion metric
Consider a microdata set T with p numeric attributes and n records, where each
record is represented as a vector in a p-dimensional space. For a given positive
integer k  n, a microaggregation method partitions T into g groups where each
group contains at least k records (to satisfy k-anonymity), and then replaces the
records in each group with the median of the group. Let ni denote the number
of records in the ith group, and xij; 1  j  ni, denote the jth record in the ith
group. Then, ni  k for i = 1 to g, and
Pg
i=1 ni = n. The centroid of the ith
group, denoted by mi, is calculated as the middle most (median) vector of all the
records in the ith group. By using median, the microaggregated dataset produces
similar data as the original dataset but not the same data and so there is still
a chance of information loss. Information loss is used to quantify the amount of
information of a dataset that is lost after applying a microaggregation method.
To reduce the information loss it is necessary to form groups using a criterion
of maximum similarity. This means the records in each group are closer to each
other. To measure whether the records in each group are close to each other,
in this chapter we use sum of absolute deviations from median (ADM) of each
group and this is dened as
ADM =
gX
i=1
pX
l=1
niX
j=1
j (xilj  mil) j (7.1)
where, xilj is the jth record of the lth attribute in the ith group and mil is the
median of the lth attribute in the ith group. As we replace each record by their
corresponding group median, the distortion is measured by the dierence between
individual record and its median. The lower the distance, the closer the median
is to its original value, and the higher the distance, the further the median is
from its true value. We are only measuring the distance as it is of no interest
to us whether the distance is positive or negative. Thus we take the absolute
dierence and the ADM is used to measure the information loss due to using the
CHAPTER 7. MEDIAN-BASED MICROAGGRAGATION FOR SDC 128
median based microaggregation method. On the other hand, ADM could also be
used to measure the homogeneity of the groups. The lower the ADM, the more
homogeneous the records of the group are to each other.
Previously, the most common measure of information loss proposed by Domingo-
Ferrer and Mateo-Sanz [3] was the Sum of Squares of Errors (SSE) and this is
dened by
SSE =
gX
i=1
pX
l=1
niX
j=1
(xilj   xil)2 (7.2)
where p is the total number of numerical attributes in the dataset and xil is
the mean of the lth variable in the ith group. It should be noted that the
sum of deviations from their mean of a set of observations is always zero, i.e.P
i=1(xi   x) = 0 and so the sum of squares of deviations from mean was used
to measure the similarity of each group. As in this chapter we are taking the
sum of deviations from median, i.e.
P
i=1(xi   m), it always gives a value and
so we do not need to square these deviations, but rather we take the absolute
value of these deviations. Thus, given a homogeneity measure such as ADM and
a security parameter k, which determines the minimum cardinality of the groups,
the microaggregation problem can be enumerated as follows:
Denition 7.3.1 Given a dataset T of n elements and a positive integer k, nd
a partitioning G = fG1; G2; :::; Ggg of T such that ADM is a minimized subject
to the constraint that j Gi j k for any Gi 2 G.
Once we get the homogeneous groups, the median value over each group is
computed and replaces each of the original group values. Thus we get a microag-
gregated microdata set which could be published for general public use. This
conrms that the microaggregated dataset is similar to the original data and
preserves the privacy of individuals as well as increases the data utility.
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7.4 Analysis of the Approach
As discussed, in this chapter we proposed a median based microaggregation
method and proposed a distortion metric ADM to measure the homogeneity of
the records in a group. In this section we will discuss some of the properties of
the proposed approach and the metric.
Theorem 7.4.1 Suppose an attribute in a dataset consists of some groups and
each group consists of records of at least k. Let the records of each group be
replaced by the median of the corresponding group. Then the attribute consist-
ing of the original records and the attribute consisting of the modied records
(medians) have the same distribution.
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Figure 7.3: Values of a attribute
Proof Suppose an attribute in a dataset consists of n records that are exactly
divisible by k. So the attribute consists of g = n
k
groups and each group consists
of k records. Suppose the attribute consists of the values, x1; :::; xk; xk+1; :::x2k;
:::; x(g 1)k+1; :::; xgk, where the rst group consists of rst k-values, the second
group consists of second k values, ..., and the last group consists of last k-
values as shown in Figure 7.3. Also let mi(i = 1; :::; g) be the median of the
ith group respectively, where mi is the middle most observation of the ith group,
when the values in ith group are arranged in order of magnitude. Thus the
corresponding microaggregated values of the original values of the attribute are
m1; :::;m1;m2; :::;m2; :::;mg; :::;mg, where rst k-values consists of the rst group,
second k-values consists of the second group and so on, if median is replaced as the
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centroid. Thus we get match pair data and let (Xi;Mi) be n pairs of observations.
We wish to test,
H0 : X and M follow the same distribution,
Ha : The two distributions dier in location.
Let Di = Xi  Mi. Under H0, both X and M come from the same distribu-
tions, so
P (Di is positive) = P (Di is negative) =
1
2
.
Let W be the total number of positive dierences (D0is). If Xi and Mi follow
the same distribution then W follows Binomial distribution with parameters n
and 1
2
. Suppose the values in each group are arranged in order of magnitude,
thus for each group we get the rst half as a positive sign and the other half as
a negative sign. We omit pairs for which there is no dierence, and this may be
caused when k is an odd number. Thus nally the total number of positive sign
is n g
2
, if n is odd and n
2
, if n is even. That means, the number of positive signs
and the number of negative signs would be the same whether k is even or odd.
This is exactly what we would expect if there is no dierence. Thus we can not
reject H0, which shows that the original values and the modied values of the
attribute follow the same distribution and thus they are similar. Similarly this
can be shown if n is not exactly divisible by k. This is true for each and every
attribute in a microdata set. Thus if a microdata set is partitioned in to some
groups and each record of a particular group is replaced by the corresponding
median, then the microaggregated microdata set and the original dataset have
the same distribution.
We will now show that the homogeneity measure ADM proposed in this chap-
ter is always less than the so called homogeneity measure SSE. Before that we
would like to discuss the following theorem.
Theorem 7.4.2 The sum of absolute deviations of a set of observations from
their median is always less than the deviations from mean.
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Proof Let x1; x2; :::; xn be a set of n observations. Let us assume that n is an
even number and so n = 2p , where n is an integer. Thus median (m) lies between
xp to xp+1. Also let x be the arithmetic mean which lies between xk to xk+1. Here
we would like to show thatPn
i=1 j xi  m j
Pn
i=1 j xi   x j
x
1
x x x x xx
2 k p p+1 n
.....
k+1
..... .....
mean median
k p-k n-p
Let us rst take the absolute deviations from mean, say D1
D1 = (x  x1) + (x  x2) + :::+ (x  xk)
= (xk+1   x) + (xk+2   x) + :::+ (xp   x)
= (xp+1   x) + (xp+2   x) + :::+ (xn   x) (7.3)
and the absolute deviations from median, say D2
D2 = (m  x1) + (m  x2) + :::+ (m  xk)
= (m  xk+1) + (m  xk+2) + :::+ (m  xp)
= (xp+1  m) + (xp+2  m) + :::+ (xn  m) (7.4)
Therefore,
D1  D2 = (x m)k   (x+m)(p  k)  (x m)(n  p)
+ 2(xk+1 + xk+2 + :::+ xp)
= 2(xk+1 + xk+2 + :::+ xp   x(p  k))
= 2[(xk+1   x) + (xk+2   x) + :::+ (xp   x))] (7.5)
which is a positive quantity, so the sum of absolute deviations from median is
always less than the deviations from mean. In other words,Pn
i=1 j xi  m j
Pn
i=1 j xi   x j.
Thus without any loss of generality, we can say that
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Pn
i=1 j xi  m j
Pn
i=1(xi   x)2.
This is true for every group in an attribute, for every attribute and for every
dataset consisting of several numeric attributes. So,
gX
i=1
pX
l=1
niX
j=1
j (xilj  mil) j 
gX
i=1
pX
l=1
niX
j=1
(xilj   xli)2
=) ADM  SSE (7.6)
Thus the proposed homogeneity measure in this chapter, ADM is always less than
the SSE. In other words, ADM always incur less information loss than the SSE
for any dataset.
7.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a new microaggregation method for numerical at-
tributes. The new method consists of clustering individuals records in microdata
in a number of disjointed groups prior to publication and then publishing the
median over each group instead of individual records. We have shown by using
a statistical test that the produced microaggregated data and the original data
have the same distribution. As it produces a similar dataset, the statistical results
also produce similar results as the original dataset. In addition, in this chapter
we proposed a distortion metric to measure the homogeneity of the records in a
group. The metric, called ADM can be used to measure the amount of informa-
tion loss due to microaggregation. We have shown that ADM always produces
less information loss than the previous information loss metric. This method of
microaggregation can be extremely useful for researchers, experts and the asso-
ciated people to analyse data accurately and eciently as it protects the privacy
of individuals as well as producing similar original data sets.
Chapter 8
Conclusions and future work
The privacy issue is not a new challenge in the eld of information technology.
Although much eort has been made in the past, it seems that many problems still
remain open and they are getting more challenging. This is due to information
technology becoming more intricate and directly involving many areas of our
lives. In this thesis, we have discussed various issues of information privacy. We
have focused on three broad areas, namely access control, data anonymization
and statistical disclosure control.
With respect to data privacy, we rst considered the problem of access con-
trol. Access control is used to control which parts of the data can be accessed
by dierent users. Several models have been proposed for specifying and enforc-
ing access control in databases [80]. The traditional access control models focus
on which user is performing which action on which data object. But a reliable
privacy policy is concerned with which data object is used for which purpose(s).
Some organisations may have published privacy policies, which promise privacy
protection practices on data collection, use and disclosure, but these practices
may not be implemented. To maintain consistency between the privacy policy
and the practices, privacy protection requirements in privacy policy should be
formally specied. In specifying privacy policy, we use purpose as the basis of
access control. In the rst part of this thesis, we have presented a model for
privacy preserving access control which is based on a variety of purposes. Con-
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ditional purpose is applied along with allowed purpose and prohibited purpose
in the model. This allows users using some data for certain purpose with condi-
tions. We have called this the conditional purpose-based access control (CPBAC)
model that enables enterprises to operate as reliable keepers of their customers
data. Finally we injected the CPBAC model with the conventional well known
role-based access control (RBAC). Based on RBAC, in this part we presented a
role -involved purpose-based access control (RPAC) model, where users explicitly
state their access purpose when they try to access data. We have also presented
a conditional role-involved purpose-based access control (CPAC) model, where
access purpose permission is assigned to conditional roles (CR). The CR is based
on the notion of role attribute and system attribute. Users dynamically activate
conditional roles in the CPAC model in accordance with the context attributes
during the access purpose and after the purpose compliance process, so that only
the users who are purpose compliant or conditionally compliant can be returned
to the users.
Our propose model provides a comprehensive framework for the privacy pre-
serving access control system, but much more work still remains to be done.
Future work includes devising a high level language for a conditional purpose-
oriented privacy policy which can be used to automatically manage the intended
purposes of the data. Compatibility issues with P3P will also be investigated.
We also plan to extend our model to cope with other elements of privacy such as
obligations and complex conditions.
Role Engineering is a security-critical tasks for systems using role-based ac-
cess control (RBAC). Dierent role-mining approaches have been proposed that
attempt to automatically infer appropriate roles from existing user-permission
assignments. Devising a complete and correct set of roles has been recognized
as one of the most important an challenging tasks in implementing RBAC. In
the CPAC model proposed in this thesis, we used the idea of CR which is based
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on the role attribute and system attribute. Our future work is also to dene
the conditional role mining problem (CRMP) as the problem of discovering an
optimal set of conditional roles from existing user permission.
Next, we considered the problem of data anonymization. Publishing data
about individuals without revealing sensitive information is an important prob-
lem. The notion of privacy called k-anonymity has attracted a lot of research
attention recently. In a k-anonymized database, values of quasi-identifying at-
tributes are suppressed or generalized so that for each record there are at least
(k   1) records in the modied table that have exactly the same values for the
quasi-identiers. However, the performance of the best known approximation
algorithms for k-anonymity depends on the information loss and the execution
time. In the second part of this thesis, we introduced clustering as a technique to
anonymize quasi identiers before publishing them. We referred to this technique
as a systematic clustering problem for k-anonymization. The proposed technique
adopts group similar data together in a systematic way and then anonymises
each group individually. Extensive experimental studies are conducted to show
the eciency and the eectiveness of the algorithm. The experimental results
showed that the proposed systematic clustering algorithm has a reasonable dom-
inance over the recent clustering algorithms for k-anonymization. At the end of
the second part of this thesis, we extended the algorithm for the l-diversity model
as an enhanced k-anonymity model. The proposed technique for the l-diversity
model also uses the idea of clustering and was implemented in two steps, namely
the clustering step for k-anonymization and the l-diverse step.
Recently many disparities of the k- anonymity model have been proposed in
the literature to further protect the private information, e.g., t-closeness [46], and
(; k)-anonymity. Our further work will be to extend the systematic clustering
algorithm to these models.
In the last part of this thesis, we addressed the problem of statistical disclosure
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control (SDC)-revealing aggregate statistics about a population while preserving
the privacy of individuals. In this thesis, we focused on microaggregation which
is a family of SDC techniques for continuous microdata. Raw microdata (i.e.,
individual records) are grouped into small aggregates prior to publication. Each
aggregate should contain at least k records to prevent disclosure of individual
information. Fixed-size microaggregation consists of taking xed-size microag-
gregates (size k). Data oriented microaggregation (with variable group size) was
introduced recently. Regardless of the group size, microaggregation on a multidi-
mensional dataset can be formed using univariate techniques on projected data or
using multivariate techniques. We presented two heuristic algorithms of xed size
microaggregation to protect the privacy of individuals in microdata while allowing
users to mine useful trends and patterns. The rst heuristic consists of clustering
individual records in microdata in a number of disjointed clusters in a systematic
way prior publication and then publish the mean over each cluster instead of in-
dividual records. We refer to this heuristic as a systematic microaggregation for
SDC. Experimental studies have been conducted and has shown that the proposed
systematic clustering algorithm for microaggregation performs better in terms of
both information loss and execution time over the most popularly used microag-
gregation method MDAV. It has also shown that the proposed algorithm is highly
saleable. The second heuristic was adopted simultaneously to form two distant
clusters at a time in a systematic way and then anonymized with the centroid of
each cluster individually and we have referred to this as a Pairwise-Systematic
(PS) microaggregation. Experimental studies on the proposed algorithm were
conducted and compared with the most widely used microaggregation methods.
To show the consistency of the algorithm, we used three benchmark datasets,
namely Tarragona, Census and EIA. The experimental results show that the pro-
posed algorithm has a signicant dominance over the recent microaggregation
methods with respect to information loss. Thus the proposed method is very
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eective to preserve the privacy of respondents' contribution to microdata sets
and can be used as a microaggregation method in SDC.
Finally, we introduced a new microaggregation method, where the centroid
is considered as median. We showed by statistical test (sign test) that the mi-
croaggregated data and the original data have the same distribution, and thus the
expected statistical results are similar to the original dataset. We also proposed a
distortion metric to measure the homogeneity of the records in a group. The met-
ric, called Absolute Deviation from Median (ADM), can be used to measure the
amount of information loss due to microaggregation. As this method produces
similar original datasets as well as protects the private information of individu-
als, it can be extremely useful for researchers, experts and associated people to
analyse data accurately and eciently.
The microaggregation problem can be regarded as a constraint single-objective
problem, where the objective is to minimize the information loss, and the con-
straint is the k-anonymity requirement. Many variations of the k-anonymity
model have recently been proposed to further protect data from identication,
such as l-diversity [40], (; k)-anonymity [47],m-condentiality [118], (k; e)-anony-
mity [121] and (c; k)-safety [122]. An interesting direction for further investigation
would be to formalize these models as a constraint multi-objective optimization
problem, and develop new microaggregation methods based on it. The proposed
microaggregation methods in this thesis would be a novelty in all of them.
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